THE
HENRY M. JACKSON
MEMORIAL LECTURE

James Schlesinger

Uncharted Waters:
America's Role in the Post-Cold War World

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The Henry M. Jackson Foundation was established in 1983 following the death of its namesake. A non-profit, charitable organization, the Foundation supports educational programs related to fields where Senator Jackson played a major leadership role. These include international affairs; public service; the environment and natural resources; and human rights.
The Henry M. Jackson Foundation is grateful to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer for its co-sponsorship of the Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture.

The Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lectures are presented periodically by the Henry M. Jackson Foundation to advance public discussion of important national and international concerns. The purpose of the Jackson Memorial Lectureship is to provide a significant forum in which major issues of public policy may be forthrightly addressed and critically examined. Views expressed in the lecture series are those of the speakers.
James R. Schlesinger has served his nation with distinction in a number of roles. Dr. Schlesinger joined the old Bureau of the Budget in 1969 as Assistant Director and rose to Acting Director by the time it was transformed into the Office of Management and Budget. In 1971, Dr. Schlesinger was appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission by President Nixon. In 1973, he was named Director of the Central Intelligence, a post which recognized his scholarly and political expertise in national security affairs. Following his tenure at the CIA, Dr. Schlesinger served as Secretary of Defense. In 1977, he became Assistant to the President responsible for energy: in particular, the legislation creating the Department of Energy. With that Department's formation he was asked by President Carter to become the first Secretary of Energy.

Dr. Schlesinger is a recipient of the National Security Medal. He has several books and numerous articles to his credit and has been awarded nine honorary doctorates. He has served as an Overseer of Harvard University. Dr. Schlesinger currently divides his time between the investment banking firm of Lehman Brothers, the prestigious Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and the MITRE Corporation where he serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Dr. Schlesinger is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration, a Member of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Director of the Atlantic Council and a member of the Board of Governors of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation.
WELCOME

Mr. Sam Sperry

Good evening, I’m Sam Sperry. I am with the Seattle Post-Intelligencer which is a co-sponsor of this event. I wish to welcome you this evening to what I am sure will be an interesting and informative evening. At this time I would like to introduce the Chairman of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, Mrs. Helen Hardin Jackson. Mrs. Jackson is a native of Albuquerque, New Mexico and now makes her permanent home in Everett, Washington. Helen attended Vassar College and received a degree from Scripps College at Claremont, California. In addition, Helen earned her MA degree from Columbia University in New York City. While serving on the staff of New Mexico’s Senator, Clinton Anderson, Helen met and married Washington’s U.S. Senator, Henry M. Jackson, known fondly to many of us as “Scoop.” Helen and Senator Jackson’s daughter, Anna Marie, who is here this evening, is married to Daniel Laurence; they live in Seattle with their son, Daniel Jackson Laurence. They are expecting a new addition to the family any day now. The Jackson’s son, Peter, lives in Washington D.C., where he is a graduate student working and studying at Georgetown University.

Helen is an active member of our community. She has served on the Board of Everett’s General Hospital Foundation and as a Trustee for the General Hospital Medical Center as well as numerous other boards in the greater Seattle area. In recognition for her work to establish the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, Helen received the World Citizen Award presented by the Seattle World Affairs Council. Helen serves as chairman of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, which provides grants to support work in fields of interest to which Senator Jackson devoted his life. These include public service, the environment and natural resources, human rights and international affairs, which includes enhancing the national leadership role of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies here at the University of Washington.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in giving a warm welcome to Helen Hardin Jackson.

Mr. Sam Sperry is Enterprise Editor at the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
Thank you, Mr. Sperry, for that kind introduction. I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you who have gathered here this evening. We are very fortunate to have Secretary James Schlesinger with us to deliver the sixth Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture.

In a period that spanned more than two momentous decades, Jim Schlesinger helped shape American domestic and foreign policy and served his nation with distinction. After receiving his Doctorate from Harvard University and teaching economics at the University of Virginia, he began his remarkable career in public service in 1969 as Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget. He was later appointed Acting Director of that Agency. In 1971, President Nixon named him Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and two years later he was appointed Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a post which drew on his scholarly and political expertise in national security affairs. After his tenure at the CIA, Jim was appointed Secretary of Defense and remained at the Department of Defense until 1975. The following year, President-elect Carter called on him to draft a national energy policy and develop a plan for the establishment of the Department of Energy. Having successfully accomplished this task, he became the nation’s first Secretary of Energy, taking the oath of office one day after President Carter signed the legislation creating this new Department. He held that post until August of 1979.

It is not surprising that during these years of governmental service, Jim and my husband, Scoop, worked together very closely and developed a relationship of mutual respect, strengthened by their shared values and convictions. Scoop relied on him for his vast experience in defense and security matters and valued his counsel on a wide range of topics. Scoop was not alone in his high regard for Jim. His long service to this country has been widely recognized. He is the recipient of nine honorary doctorates and numerous awards, including the National Security Medal and the Dwight Eisenhower Distinguished Service Medal. Currently, Dr. Schlesinger divides his time between the investment banking firm of Lehman Brothers and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. He remains deeply engaged in American public life.
and focuses particular attention on foreign policy with two books and many articles to his credit.

The Henry M. Jackson Foundation, along with the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, is pleased to sponsor this lecture tonight, which will be published as part of our Jackson Memorial Lecture Series. We are delighted that Jim has chosen to share with us his views on America's role in the post-Cold War era.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege to present to you this evening Secretary James Schlesinger.

Helen H. Jackson is Chairman of the Jackson Foundation and wife of the late Senator Henry M. Jackson.
ADDRESS

James Schlesinger

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here this evening at the University of Washington – and to be back in this State around which I have roamed for some 40 years – the Yakima Valley, the Tri-Cities area, the Hanford Reservation, Pullman (which houses a rival institution), Everett (where Scoop Jackson lived throughout his life), as well as here in Seattle. And I have, in addition, a special kinship with this State, in that, when I served with the old Bureau of the Budget, I was instrumental in winning approval of the North Cascades National Park, which gave special satisfaction both to Scoop Jackson and to me.

For a dozen years I have served on the Board of the Jackson Foundation. Thus, I am especially honored to have been chosen to deliver this Memorial Lecture. Being here at the Henry M. Jackson School provides me with a unique opportunity – once again to pay a tribute to Scoop. For 15 years he and I worked intimately together. Wherever I went, he was there: at the old Bureau of the Budget, at the Atomic Energy Commission (when he served on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy), at the CIA (when Scoop helped save the Agency during the Watergate affair), at the Department of Defense and, of course, at the Department of Energy, for Scoop was instrumental in helping create the Department and in bringing me there, and urging me to accept President Carter’s invitation to join his administration.

Thus for me, as the Psalmist suggests, there seemed to be no escaping of Scoop’s scrutiny. He was always there – a very solid ally in any time of trouble. So, as I reflect, the memories of Scoop Jackson come flooding back. Unavoidably, therefore, I am obliged to winnow out my material. Tonight I shall start with Jackson the Man. History, after all, is not just a product of disembodied ideas. To believe that is an abiding temptation in the academic world. Yet, to the contrary, history is made by and embodied in individuals such as Scoop.

Perhaps the first point to be made about Scoop is that he was rooted here in Washington State. He was born in and lived out his entire life in Everett. Never throughout his lengthy service did he lose touch with the people of this state. Other politicians might get lazy and lose touch with the people back home who had sent them to Washington, D.C. – but not Scoop. When his staff were questioned
about Scoop’s whereabouts, they would intone reverentially: “He is back in the State.” I so well recall Scoop’s funeral up in Everett. Almost the entire town turned out to bid farewell to Scoop. The people of Everett stood in the streets, carrying little signs such as “Gone, but not forgotten” or “Good-bye, Scoop, we’ll miss you.” Indeed, we shall. As the foundation for his long political career, Scoop Jackson demonstrated an almost ideal relationship with the people of his state.

A second point about Scoop is that in the Senate he was the embodiment of the tradition of bipartisanship. Scoop came of age in an era in which “politics stopped at the water’s edge.” For Scoop, bipartisanship was not simply an incantation. It was not something to which one paid lip service — while delivering an underhanded partisan blow. For him it was an article of faith. I wholly shared that faith — and it was the reason I felt comfortable as one of the sizable group of Jackson Republicans! Scoop was as hard on Democrats as he was on Republicans. I myself first encountered Scoop when I was at the RAND Corporation. He recruited me to provide a critique of systems analysis as it was practiced in the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara — during a Democratic administration.

A third point about Scoop is that he was an upholder and protector of institutions. He sought to sustain not only the U.S. Senate, but the Executive Branch. He protected, not only Bonneville Power, but the Central Intelligence Agency. When, during the Watergate Era, the CIA was under unjustified attack, it was Scoop Jackson who came to the rescue. Scoop was always a stalwart supporter of our Alliance system. Scoop would have disapproved, and would likely have repudiated, the current stinging by the administration of long time allies, such as the British.

Finally, Scoop, like much of his generation, believed passionately in this country as a melting pot. He would have had little sympathy for what currently is called multiculturalism. He would have feared it as an attempt to Balkanize the country and to legitimize divisiveness among the American people. I know this full well. Almost 20 years ago Scoop Jackson was the Senate’s representative on the U.S.-Puerto Rican Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico on which my brother served as Chief Economist. Many was the lecture he received from Scoop that under no circumstances could we allow languages other than English to become official in this country — for that would break apart this nation.

That may sound a little old-fashioned, but by today’s standards Scoop was a little old-fashioned. He was, in fact, an old-fashioned Progressive. Without doubt, he was a product of the Progressive movement. He believed passionately in public service. He believed that much of public policy could be established through expertise, and that partisan differences should be limited to those things that could not be
objectively determined. That was the faith of the traditional progressive, something that regrettably has become quite weak today.

Scoop was not a New Democrat – a phrase now used to describe Democrats of the 60’s and beyond, with whom Scoop regularly clashed. Scoop was an Old Democrat – more precisely an old, Old Democrat – a product of the New Deal and of the emergence of the United States as the bulwark of the Free World. He thought of the Democratic Party as the defender of the working man, of the farmer, of the small businessman. The repudiation of that party by much of the male electorate in this recent election would have distressed him.

In short, Scoop was a man of conviction, of passion, of vision. He had a lifelong scorn for sloppy thinking. His influence was widely felt in matters of policy, both foreign and domestic. It showed what a single U. S. Senator of energy and conviction could accomplish.

Scoop would have been gladdened to witness the collapse of Soviet communism and the Soviet threat and the end of the Cold War. Those challenges had absorbed much of his energy for some 35 years. It is a pity that he was not there to witness the collapse. Yet, much of what we have seen in the years since his death would have saddened him. As a Progressive he believed strongly in seeking out the best minds, the best talents, irrespective of party, to serve in government. Therefore he would have been astonished at the apparent indifference of this Administration to the quality and qualifications of its personnel and to the well-being of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. Such indifference could scarcely be an effective route for re-establishing the public’s faith in government.

Scoop would hardly have been an enthusiast for term limits. Indeed, the strength of the movement for term limits would have astonished him, especially in this state. Between them, Scoop and Maggie – Senator Magnuson – had, I believe, 86 years of service in the House and Senate – to the benefit of both the nation and Washington State. He believed in the importance of experience and, incidentally, clout.

Finally, Scoop would have been deeply disturbed by the erosion of bipartisanship in the nation’s affairs – save as an incantation or slogan. He would have been distressed by the drift presently to be observed in the nation’s foreign policy – and in the loss of a sense of direction.
Let me turn then to these uncharted waters of the post-Cold War world, to America’s place in it, and to the widespread sense of drift regarding our foreign policy. The initial point that I should make is to highlight the degree of change in the world in which we live. It has been said that the world has been transformed – with exasperating frequency. That has become almost a cliché. Yet, it is also far more than a cliché, for there are elements of this newly transformed world that we still do not recognize. So, while we acknowledge change, the extent of the transformation has not yet sunk in – with the American people and with others. Though we casually speak of a transformed world, still we have failed to appreciate that the world has altered in ways that we did not anticipate and which are inconvenient from our standpoint.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a kind of euphoria spread through much of the world. That was perhaps natural. The threat, after all, had substantially evaporated. For all too many, there was an exaggerated, not to say naive, expectation regarding what the post-Cold War world might look like. That expectation is perhaps best symbolized in President Bush’s phrase, The New World Order. I scarcely need to tell you that there is no New World Order out there. While it is a radically altered world, it is quite disorderly, and marked by old disorders reminiscent of the period before the Cold War and, indeed, much of mankind’s history. Robert Gates, who is here with us tonight, was then Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and deputy to Brent Scowcroft, though he later became Director of Central Intelligence. He was once asked: “Where did this phrase, New World Order, come from?” Before responding he took a long time for reflection – and finally said: “The phrase, New World Order, comes from allowing the President of the United States and his Assistant for National Security Affairs to go offshore Maine all by themselves, when the bluefish were not biting.”

It has not turned out to be an orderly world. To be sure the Russians have been quite friendly, indeed eager to cooperate with the West. They recognize that to a considerable extent their own hopes depend upon the goodwill of the West. But we too hope that they will remain reasonably friendly. These realities were reflected in the recent summit between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. But the end of the Cold War has also released explosive forces. Though that should not have come as a surprise, it came as a surprise to all too many. These explosive tendencies had been held in check, had been suppressed by the disciplines that were imposed on the two camps by the enduring lines of force that prevailed throughout the period of the Cold War.
Once the Cold War ended, we witnessed an explosion of these long-suppressed tendencies: ethnic rivalries, national rivalries, regional power politics, bullying, and sheer thuggery. In Eastern Europe, the developments reminded one of what we had seen in the inter-war period. In the Caucasus and in Central Asia, there was a renewal of the conflict that had existed—before Lenin reimposed Russian rule in the early 1920's. Such turmoil should not have been surprising. Similar difficulties have regularly accompanied the collapse of empires. Almost by definition, the collapse of empires brings in its wake instability, if not chaos. Let me recall for you the Europe that existed in the inter-war period. After World War I, we witnessed the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, and the Russian Empire; and that left in its wake for some 20 years, right up to World War II, a highly troubled condition, if not chaos. And in the Middle East something similar had occurred. For one never again has seen the stability that existed before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Such forces had largely been contained by the Cold War disciplines. With the end of the Cold War, they were unleashed. Again I assert that this should not have come as a surprise. We are going to have turbulence— as long as the human race is around.

How should we cope with these revived tensions? First we must understand that part of the problem lies in the undue expectations regarding the role the United States would play in the post-Cold War period, as the Cold War came to a close. That was part of the euphoria. There was a widespread belief that the United States could either talk erring states into appropriate behavior or, if need be, force others to behave appropriately. Force would be applied through coalition-building, either through the United Nations or outside, on the model of the Gulf War. Such hopes were widely spread, not only in this country, but throughout our alliance system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the newly cooperative attitude of Russia, the United States could serve in the role, if not of international policeman, still as the leader of an international posse.

That, however, was just not in the cards. For that there were several reasons. Foremost is the deep-seated attitude of the American people—to which I shall turn in a moment. As a contributing factor, after 1992, we had a new administration that was inexperienced and which also had certain preconceived attitudes about foreign policy not well grounded in reality. In addition, other nations lacked either the resources or the inclination to make adequate contributions to a joint effort. While eager to cheer the United States on, their own contributions would likely leave the United States with a disproportionate burden for sustaining international stability—a burden greater than the American people were prepared to accept.
First, let me underscore the inherent difficulties in dealing with this post-Cold War era. It was psychologically and politically a lot easier to deter the Soviet Union than to impose order on an unruly world. The American nation was ideally suited to serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union posed a visible, singular, monolithic, seemingly permanent threat of a political-military character—that only the United States had the resources to counter. We responded to the call to prevent authoritarian domination of the Eurasian landmass.

Yet, with the demise of the Soviet Union, our foreign policy has lost its bearings. No longer is there a magnetic north. We deal with a far more complicated world. There is no single, massive threat out there. The world has become sort of kaleidoscopic—with little permanence and bewildering changes. Crises erupt; nations change sides; the players themselves seem to change. As opposed to the simple world that we saw in an earlier period, it is a much more complex world. For example, if one takes the Middle East, there is no longer a simple set of players, some permanently wearing black hats, some permanently wearing white hats. Yasser Arafat, for example, who for many years was portrayed simply as a villain wearing a black hat, has now donned a white hat and has become a hero. President Assad of Syria, until recently a master of terrorism, is being portrayed as a hoped-for hero. The American public does not respond effectively or well to these kaleidoscopic changes in the outside world—which does not sharply define who it is that we must develop a consensus to oppose or support. Needless to say the American people responded far better to the seemingly permanent conditions of the Cold War.

The American public is not really up to multiple crusades. It is not up to the role of playing the world policeman. This may come as a shock to idealists of one stripe or another. This nation has no imperial tradition (at least outside of the North American continent). It has only slight imperial experience—and that well-disguised. Unlike the European powers, unlike Japan, it has lacked the ruthlessness and the tenacity required to bear the imperial burden of imposing order. The American people rapidly lose patience and become disenchanted if the country becomes engaged in conflicts abroad which last too long, or result in violence that appears on television. Despite the desire of many of our elites, the American people have little desire to impose order on a wicked world. And so, those who expected the United States in this post-Cold War world to serve as international constable, ready to suppress the many examples of unruliness or thuggery around the world, have been disappointed. Perhaps most notably, our European allies who expected the United States to serve as a kind of deus ex machina in Bosnia—though initially telling us that they could handle the problem.
by themselves and for us to stay out – now express keen disappointment regarding the American role. Where, they ask, is American leadership? That problem has been compounded by our seemingly ever-changing policies regarding Bosnia.

I shall return to that issue in a moment. Before I do, however, I should add that even during the Cold War, this problem of a highly disorderly world existed. International disorder did not cease during the Cold War. It continued to occur in many parts of the Third World. The difference was that during that period we simply disregarded many examples of Third World turmoil that distracted us from the central issue of the Cold War. Other episodes — in Indonesia or the Horn of Africa or the Middle East or even the Congo — we tended to treat as regional manifestations of the central strategic struggle. Thus, during the Cold War we either ignored such affairs, or, alternatively, ascribed them to Soviet malevolence.

Let me turn now from how the world has changed to how the new administration has responded in its foreign policy. Perhaps I should remind you again that at its outset this administration was marked by an unusual inexperience in foreign policy. That lack of experience was perhaps best captured in a comment by one of the White House staffers at the time of the recent summit in Italy. This was his first trip to Europe. In Rome, when asked how he had enjoyed the visit, he replied that he had enjoyed it a great deal, but he did think that “the statues looked a little worn.”

One problem that the administration has had from the start was a set of neo-Wilsonian preconceptions: if a wrong occurred anywhere, the perpetrator should be chided if not repressed, and that the “international community” should set things right. In the beginning the administration characterized its foreign policy as “assertive multi-lateralism.” Whenever the United States saw an injustice, it would act through the United Nations and would join with other members of the U.N. in bringing about a just settlement of that problem. As a policy prescription “assertive multi-lateralism” lasted about eight months — until it reached the U.S. Congress. In the course of discussing the specific premises of that policy, embodied in something called Presidential Decision Directive #13, it was rapidly squashed under the weight of traditional attitudes, reflected in the Congress. American forces would not be placed under foreign command, and the United States would not join in U.N. military ventures unless American interests were directly involved. As a result of Congressional opposition, the administration adjusted — or more precisely, abandoned — its prior position.

Another problem that the administration has had is that it came into office with a number of commitments from the campaign. These
included, most notably, commitments regarding Bosnia, China, and Haiti. Gradually it discovered it was far easier to strike a posture during a political campaign than to deliver on commitments once in office. With respect to Bosnia, the problem was less the reluctance of the administration to become seriously engaged – than it was the repeated shifts in policy and pronouncements that seem to have persisted down to today. With respect to China – an issue of particular interest here in Seattle – the administration took a clear and firm position which drew on actions by the previous Congress and its own campaign commitments. Reflecting its criticism of the Bush Administration, it asserted that it would not coddle tyrants in Beijing. Some months after he took office, President Clinton signed an Executive Order which stated that, unless the Chinese showed “substantial progress” with respect to human rights, one year later the U.S. would cut off most-favored-nation treatment.

Simply put, the United States had painted itself into a corner. If we failed to execute the threat, we would appear weak, but if we did execute the threat and cut off most favored nation treatment for China, we would be doing something irrational. The Chinese did not blink – quite the contrary. After one year the United States was obliged to back down publicly and completely. We avoided doing the irrational thing, to cut off most-favored-nation treatment of China. Instead (and quite correctly), we did the weak thing.

But that display of weakness created problems with respect to our other policies – which was subsequently reflected in Haiti. Here again the administration followed a sequence of policies. But, under pressure from the Congress and from outsiders, the administration ultimately adopted a firm policy: Aristide would have to be restored and the general officers who had removed him from office would be obliged to leave Haiti. In this case, once again, the administration had painted itself into a corner. Once again, it ultimately did the correct thing: in order to sustain the credibility of the United States, it moved into Haiti. It would have been ill-advised for us to back down once again – especially in light of Haiti’s weakness. But now, as the military would say, we have bought the problem. It is not clear what the long-run costs or consequences will be. In the short run, it has clearly distracted us – and our attention – from other more significant issues, such as North Korea, that directly affect our interests.

One certainly hopes that the administration’s performance on foreign policy will improve over time. Experience has already taught it a greater caution. Yet, we are now in a period following a substantial rebuke to the administration in the recent elections. The result has been to restore for the first time in 40 years the Republicans to total control of Congress. I would be the first to concede that gridlock may have its
advantages—domestically. Indeed, it has been said that recent experience may have created a nostalgia for gridlock. Yet, I have never been able to see any advantages that gridlock can offer with respect to foreign policy. The previous Congress regretfully meddled in President Bush’s foreign policy, notably in China. The forthcoming Congress already has revealed a desire to meddle, rather destructively, in our policies toward NATO and Bosnia. Unfortunately, we are likely to see major conflict between the President and the Congress—even greater than the friction that existed in the administration’s first two years.

Given the results of the election, as it looks to the future, the administration clearly is turning away from an earlier emphasis on domestic policy. Given the electoral outcome, the administration would be unable to get its own proposals for domestic reform through the Congress. So the administration—like other administrations before it—is now turning towards foreign policy. You may recall the injunction on the wall of campaign head-quarters in Little Rock. It stated: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Now, however, the administration is turning outward. Rather than its being the economy, “It’s foreign policy, stupid.”

What conclusions might we draw from these dashed expectations regarding the post-Cold War world? As long as the human race is around, we shall have turbulence. The United States will not be willing to serve as the world policeman. Nor will it serve as a white knight. Nor will it be available as a deus ex machina to extricate others from their embarrassments. Given the realities, the United States will be prepared to intervene only in a limited number of episodes. Yet, one must also bear in mind that the United States remains the leading world power.

Only the United States has the standing and the resources to be the international leader. There is no one else. Leadership, however, is not a birthright. It must be earned. How must we act to earn— or retain—that leadership? Among other things, it will require greater self-restraint. We must avoid grandiose pronouncements. We must avoid making threats that we are unprepared to back up. We must avoid talking publicly about ambitions that we are not prepared to support. We must, in general, avoid loose talk.

We must therefore become more selective, picking those tasks suitable for the American society, and carry through on those tasks. We must determine what our priorities are, avoid picking fights, avoid verbal confrontations, keep our rhetoric under control. If we fail to do that—if we pick fights, if we have verbal confrontations that we are unprepared to back up by force, if we engage in rhetoric that we are unwilling to support—we shall regularly find that we have painted ourselves into a corner. And that is a perfect way to destroy our own credibility.

We must understand that for great powers the essence of foreign
policy is steadfastness, reasonable predictability, constancy, a willingness to live up to our commitments. To be a great power, a nation must be credible. Credibility is, quite simply, the first rule of leadership. We must not enter into commitments – unless we are prepared to back them up. We should not expand commitments – unless we have the power to enforce those commitments. If we fail to abide by these relatively simple guidelines, our international standing will continue to wane.

Scoop Jackson would have understood the need for selectivity. What might have been his priorities? First, I believe Scoop would have been strongly supportive of the approach towards Russia that has been taken by both the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration. Indeed, he would likely have supported far more vigorous action than either of these administrations has taken. He would not have allowed the emotions of the Cold War to cloud his view about the future of Russia. Admittedly, there are risks in Russia. Russia may ultimately turn away from the democratic path. Russia may again become hostile toward the West. But until it does so, it is important to support Russia. Indeed, I suspect that Scoop Jackson, supporter of the Marshall Plan, would have been distressed to find that our efforts to support Russia, as it has moved along the path toward democracy, as unimaginative as they have been.

A second area in which Scoop would have been prepared to invest America’s strength is East Asia. He would have followed the evolution of China with both sympathy and concern. Both economically and politically East Asia is becoming increasingly important in the world. Its critical role has recently been reinforced by the movement of North Korea toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Why is that? North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons would upset the stability of Northeast Asia. South Korea is beginning to ask itself whether or not it should acquire nuclear weapons. If North Korea has a nuclear capability, the Japanese will likely ask themselves this same question. It is notable that the Japanese have recently created a commission to re-examine their national security policies. So, much remains at stake in Northeast Asia. Much is also at stake with respect to America’s general policy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is important, therefore, to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. As yet we have failed to resolve that issue.

Third, I need scarcely mention that Scoop would have placed a continuing priority on the stability of the Middle East; first, because of his long-standing support of Israel and, second, because of his long-standing concern about energy matters. The Persian Gulf continues to be the principal source of energy for the industrial world. That dependency will continue to grow over the course of the next two decades. The United States itself, at this juncture, already imports more than half of
its oil. Thus for reasons, both practical and idealistic, the Middle East should continue to have a high priority in America's foreign policy.

These areas continue to represent important interests for the United States. These are areas in which the United States must be prepared to invest its resources and, if need be, its forces. In addition, I believe that Scoop Jackson would have wished to maintain our traditional systems of alliances. Elsewhere, in the absence of threats to America's vital interests, we should be quite cautious about making commitments which the American public may not be willing to support or we might be unwilling to keep.

Still in this post-Cold War world, the United States remains the only nation that can provide direction to the international community. It is a responsibility that has fallen upon us; we must exercise it with care. If we fail to do so, no other nation can stand in our place. As a result, the forces of chaos in the world would grow ever stronger, eventually threatening our own vital interests. Thus, in this post-Cold War world our responsibility continues to be large and Scoop Jackson would cheerfully have accepted that responsibility.

Thank you.
Discussion

**Question:** What is an appropriate military budget for current American defense needs, and given our budget problems, should we cut defense?

**Answer:** If you talk to policy makers, or to anyone who does not face the haphazard life of dealing with an electorate, the preferred way of dealing with our present problems is not to increase taxes or to cut the military, but to take on the entitlements programs. If you talk to anyone on Capitol Hill in private, that will be conceded. In public, there is no willingness to do so. That is partly because the American electorate is somewhat schizophrenic. If you ask the electorate if we should cut entitlement programs, 65 percent say yes. Yet, if you ask the public if we should cut Social Security or Medicare or Medicaid, only 25 percent say yes. Those who face the electorate recognize that peculiarity, so I don't think it likely we would take on the entitlements problems, and I think it is even less likely after the results of the 1994 election.

To address the issue of the appropriate size of the U.S. military establishment: There is always some foreign policy for which any military budget is appropriate. If we have a foreign policy to defend only the shores of the U.S., we can drop to $30/$40 billion and cut the budget by 70 percent or 80 percent. The question is, before beginning to downsize the defense establishment, one must think through what our foreign policy should be. These are not separate issues. One cannot decide that the U.S. is going to remain, in effect, the protector of order in much of the world and at the same time cut its military forces. I think the tendency for the U.S. is to expand its commitments while simultaneously shrinking its forces. Those two things won't work.

Let me give you an illustration. There are many people who want us to expand NATO to the East, not simply Poland and the Czech Republic or Hungary, but also the Baltic States and Ukraine. We will not have the military capability to prudently do that. If we are going to expand our commitments, we should not think about shrinking those forces. We have cut the defense budget too rapidly to maintain a well-balanced force. If we had reduced it over a longer period of time, we would not have caused the instabilities in the force that we presently see. But we have reduced it quite quickly. Could we have reduced as fast if we had had greater flexibility? The answer to that question is yes. But the flexibility that we require is an ability to reduce the infrastructure of the military establishment. We used to have a fleet of 1,100 bombers in
this country. We are down now to about 108 active bombers, but we still have a vast infrastructure of air fields for the U.S. Air Force. We, as a population, are prepared to see a shrinkage of the defense budget, but a very slow shrinkage of infrastructure, and in consequence we are reducing the active duty forces with astonishing rapidity. While we may be able to live with that, if we do that we will not be able to fulfill even the objectives stated by the Administration of being able to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously.

**Question:** What are the advantages and disadvantages of expanding our security commitments through NATO in Eastern Europe and how might it affect our relations with Russia?

**Answer:** The answer to the last part of that question is it would affect our relations with Russia adversely, particularly if it were done quickly. There is the possibility of slowly expanding NATO as the states that constituted the Warsaw Pact are absorbed into the NATO system over time. Let me start with the Czech Republic. We could absorb the Czech Republic into NATO almost immediately. Why? The Russians recognize that the Czech Republic, formerly Bohemia, has long been part of the West; Bohemia was part of the Holy Roman Empire going back 1,000 years. Indeed, Prague was the capital of the Holy Roman Empire. There would not be much of a protest from the Russians. Over time, Poland and Hungary could be brought in as well.

What are the disadvantages? The disadvantages are that you draw a line through Europe; those nations that lie to the west, which are under no threat whatsoever from Russia, would be guaranteed protection. By bringing those that lie east of the line, such as Ukraine and Romania, which are to some degree under threat, we would be saying to the Russians, in essence: “They are on your side of the line. They are not going to be protected by NATO.” In other words, we draw a line which specifies those nations most at risk to be lacking in a guarantee or protection. Our relations with the Russians would suffer. There are many who think that it is inevitable that Russia will turn sour, becoming, in effect, like the Weimar Republic. That is a possibility. We ought not to regard it as a certainty, however, and we ought not to anticipate those developments. Yeltsin has been quite friendly toward the West. It is inappropriate to damage his standing within Russia by too adventurous a movement to the East.

**Question:** How do you view the new leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Senator Helms?

**Answer:** The committee will be livelier under Senator Helms than it was under Senator Pell. He will issue challenges to the Administration.
Some of them will be ill-advised, some of them will be wise. He has, more or less, guaranteed a fight to cut foreign aid, which I believe, popular as it is, is ill-advised for the U.S. Some of the more dubious activities of the Administration will be put under public scrutiny. For example, the agreement with North Korea will likely be scrutinized, and it will be found not to be as satisfactory as the Administration has advertised. That will accelerate a process which I think is more or less inevitable that the agreement will come apart over the course of the period ahead.

There are many people who thought it was appropriate to have a rambunctious committee on foreign relations headed by Senator William Fulbright, challenging administration after administration on the Viet Nam War. Most of those people who favored such a committee will not find this future to be as satisfactory as the past.

**Question:** How do you perceive the Soviet threat, if any, now that the Cold War has ended, and specifically, the spectacle of Mr. Zhirinovsky as an obstacle to democracy?

**Answer:** I believe that inside Washington, there are those who would like to revive the Soviet threat. There are a lot of people around who look back with nostalgia on the good old days when there was a real challenge out there, and Zhirinovsky comes about as close as you can to providing a revival of that threat. In general, I think there is broad belief that the bloom is off the Zhirinovsky rose. His support within Russia has faded and the support for him in the last election was more a protest vote than a way of expressing disapproval with current policies. There is, generally speaking, strong resistance to Zhirinovsky. I believe there are other people who are much more likely to be elected President of Russia, who would turn Russia away from the democratic path and who could turn more hostile to the West than Russia has been under Yeltsin.

**Question:** How do you view the North Korean nuclear threat?

**Answer:** The problem in North Korea is that we are obliged either to be serious about stopping the North Koreans and taking those measures that are necessary to stop them or alternatively, to stop claiming we will take action. I was quite enthusiastic about the Administration’s emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation when it came into office. I agreed that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons was one of the major interests of the U.S. and that the Administration had improved on the Bush Administration in regard to its articulation of that problem. But the reality has not lived up to the articulation. If we are unprepared to take the necessary measures, we should never have said the things we have said.
When President Clinton was going to visit Korea in late 1993, he said: "North Korea will not be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb." That was later modified by the Administration; they indicated that a couple of nuclear weapons were all right, but that we would not tolerate a major nuclear capability. Sometime after the North Koreans decided they would not adhere to the nonproliferation treaty, we said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must have the right to challenge inspections and must be able to visit the nuclear waste dumps. We said that North Korea had to live up to its nonproliferation treaty obligations. At this stage, we have made a number of such commitments and we have achieved none of them. The recent agreement, which President Carter triggered, was designed to avoid the issue. How is that? Once again, North Korea has promised that sometime around the year 2000 the IAEA will be permitted to visit those waste dumps. It has six years to change its mind. It has promised that some time around the year 2000, it will turn over the fuel rods that are now sitting in a cooling pond in North Korea to the U.S. It will not start up its reactors, either the new ones that are coming on line or the old one that has been defueled, nor will it use its reprocessing facilities. However, we will not be able to dismantle those facilities until well after the year 2000.

Moreover, in exchange for the promises by North Korea to do those things which it has promised before and failed to do, we are planning to provide them up front with five or six billion dollars worth of assets in order to move them along. The IAEA has been deeply troubled by this because it believes, quite rightly, that this establishes a precedent of defiance of the IAEA with impunity. Further, the way we are going about this is an odd way in itself. We are going to replace a 30 thermal megawatt reactor with 6,000 thermal megawatts when we bring in two 1,000 megawatt electric reactors as a replacement. That means they can produce a tremendous amount of plutonium and of late, the Department of Energy has announced one can make a perfectly fine weapon with reactor-grade plutonium. So this solution is untenable.

I believe that President Carter's visit to Haiti got the American people and the Administration out of a deep hole. It avoided the necessity of an invasion of Haiti and he served the country well. I do not have the same view about his trip to North Korea. I think that the moment for decision was upon us, that we had said we were going to move toward economic sanctions. If we could not get others to move toward economic sanctions, I believe that we should have considered military measures. Right now, because of the agreement, we cannot move in those directions.
Question: Can you speak to the arms embargo to Bosnia? Is this a violation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter?

Answer: With regard to the issue of the violation of the United Nations Charter, at the time the United Nations made that decision, Bosnia was not yet a nation. The U.S. and the other members of the United Nations voted to cut off all arms to Yugoslavia. Subsequent to that decision, which was more or less unanimously applauded, Bosnia separated from the rest of Yugoslavia and therefore falls under that original United Nations decision. I don't know if that action would have been taken if Bosnia were independent at the time that the issue was up before the United Nations. I think the argument that this is in violation of the United Nations Charter is dubious.

The real question is what the correct thing is for the United Nations to do under present circumstances and what the correct thing is for the U.S. to do. When the U.S. makes public threats or public commitments, it should be prepared to live up to them. The U.S. has regularly threatened, both during the early part of the Administration and during the presidential campaign, to take vigorous action directed against the Bosnian Serbs. It failed to do so. It failed to do so, in part, out of its concern about the willingness of the public to support such action; out of a preference of the Department of Defense not to get seriously involved in Yugoslavia, which it feared would be another Viet Nam; and principally out of concern for our allies, who had forces on the ground in the former Yugoslavia and were strongly opposed to any change in the embargo policy. There are a variety of reasons why the U.S. backed away from its earlier commitments to do something more about Bosnia. My principal concern is regarding the credibility of the U.S. We have put ourselves into a very peculiar position because we are unwilling to put ground forces into Bosnia save as peace keeping forces after a settlement has arisen. Our allies who have forces on the ground strongly disagree with the tendencies of U.S. policy. We have asked our allies on several occasions to join with us in removing the embargo on arms to Bosnia. Each time, they have said no. The U.S. Congress has said to remove the embargo unilaterally. The Administration tried to prevent that. It is moving in the direction now of backing away from the embargo, but not in the direction of providing arms to Bosnia.

Now, what is the downside of that? The downside is to undermine the credibility of all such UN actions. And most particularly, if we are unwilling to sustain a multilateral embargo by the United Nations in Yugoslavia, we will find that other nations are unprepared to sustain the embargo against Iraq. That is also a United Nations decision. We insist they support our position in Iraq; if we back away from a general position with regard to Bosnia, we are going to find that we undermine the
effectiveness of the United Nations. We have badly strained our relationship with the French and British over this issue. The whole episode regarding Yugoslavia is an example of a policy that was too timid at the outset and which has been erratic subsequently.

Question: What concerns do you have regarding the nuclear capability of nations that could pose a threat to the U.S.?

Answer: It is plain there is a set of what we regard as rogue nations which would like to acquire a nuclear capability. The first of them, needless to say, is North Korea. That is why it is so important to squash the North Korean attempt; to the extent we fail to do so others will be attracted to that possibility. It reflects the concern at the IAEA that what we have done in our agreement with North Korea simply establishes a precedent defining the nonproliferation treaty which can bring the offending nation substantial benefits. In the case of North Korea, it has brought not only the promise of five billion dollars worth of reactor and other energy reinforcements from the outside world but it also led to diplomatic recognition by the U.S., which they have been denied over these last 40 odd years. That is a powerful temptation.

The Iranians are prepared to move in that direction; as you know, Iraq attempted to do so. We did not know the full extent of Iraq's attempt. The most powerful reason for the U.S. to remove Saddam's military capability was to thwart his movement in the direction of nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to consider military measures against North Korea and to consider military measures against Iran if it moves in that direction. Major nuclear capabilities in the hands of such outlaw states will lead to a degree of instability and blackmail and will probably lead to major damage to a number of cities around the world. Acquisition of a nuclear capability by any of the Islamic nations in the Middle East that are hostile to Israel may well result in attacks on Israel far more serious than those by Saddam's forces during the Gulf War.

Question: Can you speak to the post-Deng era and Chinese policy in the next decades? I understand the Chinese will acquire an aircraft carrier. Is that a serious threat?

Answer: I think the probabilities are that Deng has arranged for his succession. However, no one can ever be sure because this is a system which does not have clear constitutional guidelines. It may be that Deng has chosen as his successor one who is not as strong as other contenders. It is impossible to predict what the struggle for power will be like. Deng, probably even in these last days, has more concern about the stability of China after his departure than he would ever reveal even to his intimates. We can't be assured of a smooth succession, though I think
the probabilities point in that direction, because China clearly is on the path of economic modernization. It is unprepared to accept the risks associated with a major struggle for power. We remain uncertain, however, of the future.

Regarding a military threat, any aircraft carriers acquired by the People’s Republic of China would be quite obsolete and inferior. In effect, they could only be used against Taiwan or in some of the disputed islands, or, one might argue, against Japan. I doubt that China is going to be prepared to use it in any such contingency. The Chinese are likely to acquire an aircraft carrier for the same reason that many military establishments reach for weapons. They have no clear strategic role to play. If your question is directed to the concern that exists in Taiwan about the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, I think that is very much exaggerated. The likelihood of that is close to zero over the course of the next 20 years, with or without aircraft carriers. The Chinese have chosen the path of economic modernization. They are not likely to want to put that to risk in a futile international adventure.

**Question:** What is the future of nuclear power in the United States? What are the implications of our growing dependency on oil from the Persian Gulf?

**Answer:** At the moment, the future of nuclear power looks pretty grim. It may come back in the long run if the price of fossil fuel energy rises, or if the environmental community decides that nuclear power is a good thing because it essentially does not provide any pollution or indeed CO₂ in the atmosphere. I recall a story of a young boy who was taken to a cemetery and he looked down at one of the gravestones which read “Not dead, just sleeping.” The little boy looked at the gravestone and said, “He ain’t kidding nobody but himself.” I think that is the best that one can think about nuclear power. At this time, there is no utility in the U.S. that is prepared to order a nuclear plant. Many of them have been badly burned, others are likely to be burned in the future. Some have failed to get it into the rate base. Moreover, as a result of the change in our laws, we are going to have increasing competition with regard to power. Nuclear power is much more expensive than the alternatives. However, things can change.

With regard to our growing petroleum dependence, that is a risk. Clearly, to the extent we depend upon foreign sources whose supply would be at risk, we can suffer a major setback. But the likelihood of such a setback has diminished sharply. First, the biggest problem we had with regard to Persian Gulf oil was the fact that the Soviet Union was manipulating some of the countries in the Middle East, with six airborne divisions sitting just north of the Iranian border. The Soviet Union is
gone. If Russia ever has aspirations to revive, as it were, the ambitions of Peter the Great, it would now have to conquer much of Central Asia before it could get down toward the Gulf, and that would be a very good warning to the outside world.

A second risk that we had was that of a local dictator acquiring domination over the entire oil supply of the Middle East. After the Gulf War and the large scale destruction of Iraq's forces and of Saddam's ambitions, the likelihood of that is much diminished. So the national security reasons, while they are still there, are not as pressing as they were a decade ago. We are likely to continue to increase our dependency on the Middle East. Because no one can predict the future, at some point we are likely to have a problem that comes back and bites us, and we aren't going to do very much about it. If the attitude toward the national security problem changes, or the attitude towards preventing additional dumping of combustion byproducts in the atmosphere were to change substantially, nuclear power might make a comeback, but it will not be for many years.

Question: What is the role of the CIA in the post-Cold War world? Please address the issues raised by the Ames case and the control of intelligence committees by the Republicans.

Answer: The Agency probably will be slightly better off with Republicans in control of the intelligence oversight committees than it was with Democrats in charge. The Republicans tend to be rhetorically more protective of intelligence activities but they may not get much beyond rhetoric. There will continue to be steady and unremitting fiscal pressure which will bear down on our intelligence budgets. The recent rebuke to the agency and to its director (in the aftermath of the Ames case) was signed by all members of the Intelligence Oversight Committee. That Committee seems to be determined to see a substantial reduction in intelligence spending and in the number of people working in intelligence, including the Central Intelligence Agency. I think that pressure will continue. Yet there will be a difference. The Republicans will be inclined to say, "we are sorry we have to cut these intelligence budgets, but the fiscal pressure is unremitting. Our sorrow does not prevent our doing it, but you have our sympathy." Democrats are more likely to say, "we are delighted to do it, you don't have much sympathy from us," but the downward pressure will be much the same in both cases.

With regard to the Ames case, it is plain that, as has been stated by the Director, Mr. Woolsey, and by the Inspector General, Mr. Hitz, there was a protective culture within the agency that precluded taking a good, hard look at Ames, despite his record of steady misbehavior over the
course of a decade. However, there is something that should be said in defense of the agency: in our zeal to protect the civil rights of agency employees, it is not permissible to nose around in such things as bank records. Somebody can dump $2 million into the bank account of an employee. He starts to spend the money, not living on his government salary, but nobody feels free to pry. There was an excessive concern about civil rights and that excessive concern is now being reversed. But the result of the Ames case was the loss of many of our agents in Russia and a failure of the authorities at the CIA to apprehend Ames at the time that he should have been apprehended.

Question: Should the U.S., in pursuing a nonproliferation policy, renounce what has been a long-held policy of being prepared to use nuclear weapons first in an emergency? Does this not prevent other nations from signing on to an extension of the nonproliferation treaty?

Answer: The need for that has diminished very sharply. In the past, we felt that we faced major advantages for the Warsaw Pact in terms of their conventional forces. In order to counterbalance those forces and to help deter the Warsaw Pact from an invasion of Western Europe, we had to be prepared to, and announce that we were prepared to, initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Quite obviously, the Warsaw Pact is gone and Russia is not in a position to threaten any vital interests of the West. The issue of whether we should renounce that policy was taken up in the recent nuclear review and the Clinton Administration decided it should not abandon that policy. Whether it was done to propitiate its critics in the defense community, I don't know. I believe the position of the U.S. is basically correct on this issue. It may seem illogical, but just because something is illogical does not mean that it is incorrect. Why is that? The U.S. has pledged as part of the nonproliferation treaty, and the other nuclear weapon states have similarly pledged, not to use nuclear weapons against any non-weapon state. That is as important as renouncing first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear armed countries. The U.S. is in a position to demand that other countries not have nuclear weapons while we have nuclear weapons. There is no alternative to that because of the international role of the U.S. We must have an inventory of nuclear weapons which is sufficiently large to awe anybody else in the world who might be prepared to use them. The issue of no first use is, in the eyes even of the critics of the U.S., a secondary matter compared to our retention of a substantial nuclear inventory that we deny to 170 or 175 other nations around the world.
**Question:** Should we be giving Russia tremendous financial aid at this juncture?

**Answer:** I think economic aid to Russia is a kind of riverboat gamble, and as time passes, the likelihood of winning on that gamble diminishes. I say that with regret. I think that we had a greater opportunity about the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union to exercise a greater degree of imagination than we did. It would have required a commitment by the U.S. and other Western powers to a support of modernization of Russia that would have been in excess of the commitment we made in 1947 and 1948 in the Marshall Plan. It was a much more formidable task than was represented by the refurbishing of Western Europe. Yet, I think that if we had been more imaginative, we would have made that commitment. Much of the aid is, in effect, being wasted; much of the foreign exchange that goes into Russia comes out and is deposited in Swiss bank accounts and so forth. The level of crime and corruption within Russia continues to grow. So it is not a very promising situation. Even though the aid is not effective, it is not very large, and we should continue it as it is representative of Western good will toward Russia.

**Question:** Why should Ukraine give up nuclear weapons?

**Answer:** It is a tough question. We haven’t been all that persuasive. What we have done in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent in Kazakhstan, was to fly Americans into the capitals, Kiev and Almaty. They get off a plane and they say, “please give up your nuclear weapons, they are valueless, they have no value, you must give them up immediately.” They get back on the plane, they fly away, two weeks later another airplane comes in, says “please give up your nuclear weapons, they are valueless to you, they are a threat to you, give them up immediately.” They go away, a third plane comes in after another two weeks. After a while, the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs figured out they had something of considerable value that they ought to retain. It is now a bit difficult to persuade them to give them up. The nuclear weapons do not provide much protection for Ukraine. If it came to a conflict with Russia, Ukraine, which if it had recourse to its very limited effective nuclear capability, would be obliterated by Russia. It simply reinforces Ukrainian vulnerability. The Ukrainians have an asset; they are attempting to exploit that asset in effect by being prepared to sell it off piece by piece, blackmailing the outside world. That is the best use of that asset, but it will provide little security for it, in my judgment. Unfortunately, not all Ukrainians agree with that judgment.
Question: Can you speak to the U.S. policy on human rights?

Answer: Great as my admiration for the late Senator Jackson was, and is, I think he went a little too far in that area. But, he still was prudent in that respect.

For example, on his last visit to Beijing, Scoop met with Deng Xiaoping and queried him whether China could meet the requirements of Jackson-Vanik so as to earn most-favored-nation treatment. With a smile Deng responded: “I understand the requirement of the Act – allowing emigration! How many Chinese would you like to have Senator... one million Chinese... two million Chinese... five million Chinese... ten million Chinese?”

Scoop had heard enough – and changed the subject.

I think the real problem is if we make human rights central to our foreign policy. We have tried that in the case of China, and we were publicly rebuffed because the Chinese are not prepared to accommodate American notions about the internal arrangements within China. Right now, we have another “opportunity” to make human rights central with the President’s visit to Indonesia. We have demonstrations in East Timor. We are not going to do very much about that. Once again, if we are not prepared to do anything, we ought not to be taking rhetorical stands which results in our picking fights with other nations with whom we are otherwise friendly.

In the Middle East, we managed to overcome our scruples about human rights and ally ourselves with Saudi Arabia. That strikes me as wise policy, but it is not consistent with making human rights central to our foreign policy. Elsewhere in the world, we have been prepared, and will continue to be prepared, to overlook violations of human rights. If your question goes to should the U.S., because of its internal values, continuously express support for human rights in general, the answer to that is yes. If we should make it a central element in our foreign policy, I think the consequences would be that we would alienate more nations than would otherwise be the case without accomplishing very much for human rights. We can influence those countries at the margin. We have influenced China at the margin, but when we begin to broadside on the issue, we encounter a stone-wall and in fact there is a penalty paid just out of spite for the Americans. That does not help the people whose rights we are presumably attempting to protect.

Question: What is the media’s impact on U.S. foreign policy? Can the U.S. government limit communications?

Answer: I brought along a badge to explain our foreign policy. The badge says “TV made me do it.” The improvement of communications worldwide is transforming international politics. It transforms the
attitude of the U.S. public as well. In the past, before television
presented scenes of horror in Rwanda or Bosnia, the American public
would have been completely indifferent. The fact of communications
transforms international politics. This will continue to the point where
it will be very hard to maintain separate societies insular, as it were, from
information from other societies. The current attempt of the U.S.
government to protect encryption, to protect its ability to penetrate
messages, is not likely to be a success, but is likely to be a partial success,
and I am in favor of those attempts. It reminds me very much of our
attempts to prevent the spread of information on nuclear weapons. The
Atomic Energy Act says that “thou shalt not print anything about
nuclear weapons” and gave to the Atomic Energy Commission the
dubious honor of supporting that, now in the hands of the Secretary of
Energy. Some years ago, The Progressive magazine sought to publish the
design of an H-bomb, just to help out Colonel Kadhafi. Under the
Atomic Energy Act, I was, at the time, Secretary of Energy. I obtained a
prior restraint, which incidentally, was never overruled by the Courts.
Unfortunately, in enforcing the Atomic Energy Act within the boarders
of the U.S., those publishers sent that weapon design up to Winnipeg,
Canada, and they had a full page spread in the Winnipeg newspaper.
Somewhat regrettably, it is no longer possible to prevent the spread of
information.

Thank you.

On behalf of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and the Henry M.
Jackson Foundation we want to thank all of you for attending. We would
also like to thank Dr. Schlesinger for participating in this lecture series
and particularly for his informative words. To have the kind of
dedication and care regarding the strength and safety of this nation that
Dr. Schlesinger has had over his lifetime is admirable.
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