America and the Post Cold War World

Presented by
The
Henry M. Jackson
Foundation

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The Henry M. Jackson Foundation was established in 1983 following the death of its namesake. A non-profit, charitable organization, the Foundation supports educational programs related to fields where Senator Jackson played a major leadership role. These include international affairs; public service; the environment, natural resources and energy; and human rights.
The Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lectures are presented periodically by the Henry M. Jackson Foundation to advance public discussion of important national and international concerns. The purpose of the Jackson Memorial Lectureship is to provide a significant forum in which major issues of public policy may be forthrightly addressed and critically examined. Views expressed in the lecture series are those of the speakers.
Nationally syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, 1987 recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for Distinguished Commentary, has written for the Washington Post since 1984. He also contributes a monthly essay to Time magazine.

But journalism is a second career for the noted 40-year-old writer. Following his graduation from Harvard Medical School in 1975, he practiced medicine for three years as a resident and then chief resident in psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital. During that time, he published several scientific papers on manic-depressive illness and was awarded the Edwin Dunlop Prize for his research and clinical work.

Krauthammer went to Washington, D.C., in 1978 to direct planning in psychiatric research for the Carter Administration. After the 1980 Presidential campaign in which he served as speech writer to Vice President Walter Mondale, he joined the staff of The New Republic where he was an essayist and editor from 1981 to 1988.

His New Republic essays won the National Magazine Award for Essays and Criticism in 1984. He was also honored with the Champion/Tuck Media Award for Economic Understanding and the First Amendment Award given by People for the American Way. A collection of his essays and columns, Cutting Edges, was published by Random House in 1985.

A native of New York City, Krauthammer was reared in Montreal and educated at McGill (B.A. with First Class Honors in Political Science and Economics, 1970), Oxford University (Commonwealth Scholar in Politics at Balliol College, 1970-71), and Harvard University (M.D. from Harvard Medical School, 1975). He lives in Chevy Chase, Maryland, with his wife Robyn, an artist, and son Daniel.
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

Helen H. Jackson

The Henry M. Jackson Foundation is today hosting the third Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture. We are delighted that these occasions are proving to be a periodic reunion time for so many of Scoop’s former colleagues and friends. More important, perhaps, these lectures draw in others of you who are only now moving into key positions of public responsibility. Welcome to all.

When Scoop suddenly died in 1983, there was one comment, of hundreds made at the time, which I felt really struck home. It was this:

"The death of Senator Henry Jackson has left an empty stillness at the center of American politics. Jackson was the symbol and the last great leader of a political tradition that began with Woodrow Wilson and reached its apogee with John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey. That tradition, liberal internationalism, held that if democratic capitalism was to have a human face, it had to have a big heart and a strong hand."

The author of that comment was Charles Krauthammer. I am very grateful that Charles is here with us today. He is known to all of us through his weekly syndicated columns, his national TV commentary, his New Republic articles and his book Cutting Edges. There is no one now on the frontline of political analysis who provides more illumination on the intractable, fateful issues at home and abroad.

Charles’ ascent to this commanding role is not the usual story of journalism student, turned reporter, turned editorialist. His story is a journey from political science student, to medicine, to psychiatry, to government service, to writing and, increasingly, to a concern and feel for politics.

Impervious to the pull of trendy and conventional thinking, Charles is his own man. Week after week he enlightens and moves us with his special combination of reason and vision. His mark is a clinically realistic, caring and deeply moral approach.

As so many of you know, this was essentially Scoop’s approach to issues. No wonder we feel so at home with Charles. In the long and difficult years of the Cold War, Scoop championed democracy, human
rights, eternal vigilance, no illusions, common sense, good judgment, 
excellence, endurance, staying the course. In this post-Cold War period, 
with its new but still unremitting challenges, Scoop's basic approach is 
no less apt.

We can thank our lucky stars for Charles Krauthammer who, 
standing in that very tradition, wields his pen and raises his voice in this 
generation.

Charles, we are profoundly honored to have you with us to present 
the Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture.

Helen H. Jackson is Chairman of the Jackson Foundation 
and wife of the late Senator Henry M. Jackson.
ADDRESS

Charles Krauthammer

It is a great honor to have been asked to deliver the Henry Jackson Memorial Lecture. It is a high enough honor to be included in the company of Max Kampelman and Natan Sharansky, who have preceded me in this lecture. It is a singular honor to have been asked to give contemporary expression to the legacy of Henry Jackson.

For as long as I can remember, I have always been proud to call myself a Henry Jackson Democrat, and thankful that Henry Jackson's vision and courage created a unique space on the American political spectrum. A place that people like me, and I dare say many of you otherwise lost in the political landscape of this country, could call home.

The word unique is used promiscuously in Washington and with little warrant. Senator Jackson is one of the few to whom the word applied. In the Vietnam and post-Vietnam American crisis of confidence he was one of the few who remained true both to the values of the New Deal at home and to American purpose abroad.

At its core, Senator Jackson's vision of American purpose was this: that America had an obligation to its friends, to itself, to history to confront the great evil in the world. Not to right every wrong everywhere, but to confront the great evil. And he did not flinch, even when it became unfashionable, from identifying that evil as Soviet totalitarianism. For that he was called a cold warrior. Well, the thousands who emigrated from the prison that was Brezhnev's Soviet Union, and the newly liberated peoples of Eastern Europe — cold warriors all — bless his memory. It is largely because of Henry Jackson, his allies and disciples that the Cold War was fought through to the end and won. The only pity is that he did not live to see the victory.

Now that victory has been won, the question is: What is there left to do? Is there a place for the self-confident, dynamic approach to the world that Henry Jackson embodied? If so, what form does such an approach take today? That is the question I propose to look at with you today.

When I was originally asked to give this talk some months ago, I thought I would offer you a summary of my more speculative thinking and writing since the end of the Cold War came into view in late 1988.

Three principle elements have preoccupied me:
First, the emergence from a bipolar world, not of the long-predicted multipolar world, but of a unipolar world dominated by the West with the United States at its apex.

Second, the emergence of a kind of pre-war conservative isolationism, responding to the new unipolarity and resisting the burdens and responsibilities that come from being the world's only superpower.

And third, the emergence of an entirely new strategic environment dominated by what might be called the Weapon State: small, aggressive nations armed with weapons of mass destruction.

I fancied that a talk about emerging unipolarity, conservative isolationism, and the new strategic environment of the Weapon State would amount to a rather speculative talk about the future. You will now recognize it as a talk about the present.

In fact, when all hell broke loose in the Gulf on August 2, my first inclination was to call Helen and ask her to cancel my speech, that Saddam Hussein had given it. Cooler heads prevailed and here we are. So I preface my remarks with an apology: What I have to say is by now perfectly obvious.

The first element in the structure of the post-Cold War world is its striking unipolarity. It was generally assumed that after the Cold War we would go from bipolarity back to pre-World War II or pre-World War I multipolarity. And that the great pillars of the multipolar world were going to be Germany and Japan.

How quickly a myth can explode. The notion that economic power inevitably translates into military power and geopolitical influence is a materialist fantasy. Economic power is a necessary condition for great power status. But it certainly is not sufficient, as is clear to anyone observing the behavior of Germany and Japan, who pretty much hid under the table when the first shots rang out in Kuwait.

The true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world, brought sharply into focus by the Gulf crisis, is this: There is a single pole of world power which consists of the industrial West led by the United States.

The leading is most important. Because without it there is no West. In fact, it might be more accurate to say that the world's unipolar structure consists of the United States and, behind it, a Western alliance. Because where the United States does not go first, the Western alliance does not follow. That was true for the reflagging of Kuwaiti vessels in 1987. It is all the more true in the Persian Gulf today. It was
only after the United States had demonstrated its willingness to put its national prestige and its young men on the line that other Western powers followed.

The undeniable reality of unipolarity should finally explode the myth of American decline. After all, that myth as popularized by Paul Kennedy and others, was based on the definition of power as relative power. What greater augmentation of the relative power of the United States could there be than the collapse and withdrawal of its one great equal and adversary, its only military rival?

American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself. It is the United States alone, acting unilaterally and with extraordinary speed, that prevented Iraq from turning the Arabian Peninsula into a province or a protectorate.

Iraq, having inadvertently revealed the unipolar structure of today’s world, cannot stop complaining about it. It looks at allied and Soviet support for American action in the Gulf and speaks of a conspiracy of North against South. Although it is perverse for Saddam to claim to represent the South, this analysis is at least partially true. The unipolar moment means that the three great civil wars of the northern hemisphere of this century (World War I, World War II and the Cold War) have come to a close and the industrialized democratizing North sees its role as protecting itself and preserving order in the world by acting together under the leadership of the United States. That is what is taking shape now in the Persian Gulf and that is the shape of things to come.

The Iraqis are equally acute in analyzing the apparent multilateralism of what President Bush has unfortunately called a new world order. They charge that the whole multilateral U.N. apparatus established by the U.S. is nothing more than a cover and a smokescreen for an assertion of American power. Well, I certainly hope so.

There are some who see the post-communist world as a world of multilateral action led by the U.N. in which all the great powers get together on the great issues and act in concert. Such a policy is a prescription for disastrous inaction. U.N. resolutions, Security Council support, Russian backing, allied troops and Japanese money are all very welcome in this particular, or any other, American endeavor in the world. They are welcome, but they cannot be made essential. Otherwise American policy becomes prisoner to the wishes of every other actor. The more actors, the more wishes. The more wishes — most of them wishes for passivity and caution — the more constrained become American options, the less the chance of any possible success.

On the issue of multilateralism, I share Saddam’s skepticism.
Where we can get the imprimatur of the world, fine. Otherwise, we go ahead without it.

One more word about unipolarity. Unipolarity is not just an indisputable fact. It is also a value, a positive good. Pax Americana is good for the U.S. and good for the world. Good for us because we are, like Britain before us, a commercial, trading, maritime nation that needs an open, stable world environment if we are to thrive. And because Americans will be infinitely more secure in a world whose rules and structures are established in Washington and not in Baghdad or — just as bad, and inevitable, if the U.S. abdicates — a world in which the rules are made by no one.

And it is a good thing for the world that a country like America, a singularly reluctant, indeed an accidental superpower, should become the hegemonic power in the world, establishing the rules of the road and when necessary enforcing them. The alternative to Pax Americana is no pax.

Now, for a small but growing chorus of Americans this vision of a unipolar world led by a dynamic America is a nightmare. I’m speaking here of the isolationists, and that brings me to a second major element in the post-Cold War reality: the rise, or should I say the revival, particularly on the right, of American isolationism.

Let me start by saying that I have a lot of respect for American isolationism. First, because of its popular appeal and, second, because of its natural appeal. On the face of it, isolationism seems to be the logical, God-given, foreign policy for the United States. We are an island continent protected by two vast oceans, bordered by two neighbors who could not be friendlier. For two hundred years Americans have longed to be cleansed of the international intrigues of the Old World. One must have respect for a strain of American thinking so powerful that four months before Pearl Harbor the vote to extend draft enlistments passed the House of Representatives by a single vote.

Isolationists say rather unobjectionably that America should confine her attentions in the world to defending her vital national interests. But the more extreme isolationists define vital national interests to mean the physical security of the United States, and the more elusive isolationists take care never to define them at all.

Isolationists will, of course, say that I am being unfair, that they do believe in defending vital national interests beyond the physical security of the United States. But we have just had a test case in the Persian Gulf. When Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to control the Arabian Peninsula, there was a direct threat to the oil supplies of the United States, a direct threat to American allies and interests in the Middle East, and the threat of the rise of a hostile power fueled by endless oil income building an arsenal capable of launching weapons of mass
destruction anywhere in the area, perhaps even to Europe and perhaps ultimately to the United States. Last year, remember, Saddam tested a three-stage intercontinental rocket.

Now, if under these conditions you still find influential American conservatives saying that we have no business meddling in this regional dispute, then the idea that national interest as defined by isolationists is anything more than the raw physical security of the United States is nonsense. If the Persian Gulf is not a vital interest, then nothing is. All that’s left is preventing an invasion of the Florida Keys. And for that you need a Coast Guard. You don’t need a Pentagon and you certainly don’t need a Secretary of State.

Isolationism is the most extreme expression of this American desire to return to tend its vineyards. But that desire finds expression in another far more sophisticated and serious foreign policy school. I am speaking here not of isolationism but of realism, the school that insists that American foreign policy be guided solely by interests and that generally defines these interests in a narrow and national manner.

Many of realism’s practitioners were heroic in the heroic struggles against fascism and communism. Now, however, some argue that the time for heroism is passed. “It is time,” writes Jeane Kirkpatrick in the current issue of National Interest, “to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status,” time to give up the “unusual burdens of the past” and “return to normal” times. That means “taking care of pressing problems of education, family, industry and technology” at home. That means that we should not try to be the balancer of power in Europe or in Asia, nor try to shape the evolution of the Soviet Union. We should aspire, she writes, to be “a normal country in a normal time.”

Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s point is well taken. When civilization was threatened by Nazism or communism we had to act heroically. Those battles won, the world has returned to normal. We can go back to looking after our own national interest, defined as rebuilding the American economy and working to strengthen democracy. Let the rest of the world sort out its problems. We should sort out ours.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick presents a rather compelling vision of American purpose. I have only one difficulty with it. I am not sure there is such a thing as normal times. If a normal time is a time when there is no evil world empire on the loose, when the world is in ideological repose, then this may indeed be a normal time. But such a time is not necessarily peacetime. Saddam Hussein has made the point rather emphatically.

I would like to suggest that there are no normal times. As Rosanne Rosannadanna held: “It’s always something.” Even after communism, even in the absence of the marauding internationalist creeds that have haunted this century, there will be new threats disturbing our peace.
What new threats? Everyone recognizes one great change in the international environment, the collapse of communism. If that were the only change, then indeed this would be a normal time and the unipolar vision I have outlined would be seen at once unnecessary, grandiose, and dangerous.

But there is another great change in international relations. And here we come to the third and most crucial new element in the post-Cold War world: the emergence of a new strategic environment marked by the rise of the Weapon State — small, radical, and reckless regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them anywhere on earth.

Saddam’s Iraq, with its rockets, is only the harbinger, the first of many. And, as the prototypical Weapon State, it exhibits many of its peculiar characteristics:

First, the Weapon State is not much of a nation state. Iraq, for example, is a state of recent vintage with arbitrary borders. Moreover, its ruling party consciously denies that Iraq is a nation. It refers to Iraq (and Syria) as regions, part of the larger Arab nation for which it reserves the term.

Second, in the Weapon State the state apparatus is extraordinarily well-developed and completely dominates the civil society. This is a peculiar characteristic of the oil states. Normally the state needs some kind of tacit contract with the civil society because ultimately the state must rely on society to support it with taxes. The oil states are in the anomalous position of not needing a social contract because national wealth comes from oil and oil is wholly controlled by the state. These become peculiarly distributive states, in which the government is the source not only of power but of wealth, and distributes goods to society rather than the other way around. This makes possible the rise of an extraordinarily powerful and often repressive state apparatus.

Third, in the Weapon State the authorities are obsessed with military development, particularly weapons of high technology, because they see it as the only way to leapfrog history and place themselves on equal footing with the major states of the region and even the world.
The emergence of Weapon States — today Iraq, tomorrow perhaps Libya and Iran — will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. That is what makes Bush’s new world order not an imperial dream or a Wilsonian fantasy, but a matter of the sheerest prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West that there is going to be a need to establish some new world regime to police the regional disputes of the world, particularly where weapons of mass destruction are becoming available.

I note that even Neil Kinnock, leader of the British Labor Party, emphasized in the parliamentary debate on the Gulf crisis that it’s not enough to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Iraq’s chemical stocks, he said, must be destroyed and its nuclear program internationally controlled. That’s the British Labor Party speaking — hardly a collection of Henry Jackson Democrats.

How to do it? I have no definitive answer, but any solution will have to include three elements: to deny, to disarm, and to defend. First, we will have to develop a new CoCom-like regime to deny high technology to such states. Those that acquire them anyway will have to submit to strict outside control or risk being physically disarmed. A final element must be the development of anti-ballistic missile and air defense systems to defend against those weapons that do escape Western pre-emption.

There might be better tactics that we can use. But our overall strategy is clear: with the rise of the Weapon State, there is no alternative to a unipolar world in which the West, led by the United States, manages regional conflicts and confronts regional bullies, deterring and, if necessary, disarming states armed with weapons of mass destruction.

The alternative to such a robust and difficult interventionism, the alternative to unipolarity, is not a stable, static multipolar world of the 19th century variety in which mature powers like Russia, China, America, Europe and Japan jockey for position in the game of nations. The alternative to unipolarity is not multipolarity, but chaos. As shown in the Gulf, if we don’t do it, no one will. If we don’t lead, no one follows.

We are in for abnormal times. And our best hope for safety in such a difficult time, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will — the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly and confidently laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to police them. It is not a task we are any more eager to undertake than the great twilight struggle just concluded. But as Henry Jackson taught, history sometimes deprives a nation of choices. It seems to me that we have only one.

Thank you.
DISCUSSION

Additional remarks made by Dr. Krauthammer in response to points made and questions raised after the formal lecture.

A Self-Inflicted Problem

This imbalance between our geopolitical aspirations and our resources is a very acute problem, but an entirely self-inflicted problem. It has to do with an unwillingness to tax ourselves while demanding a very high standard of living, an unwillingness to make any kind of sacrifices in the name of our needs abroad and at home.

The Paul Kennedy school argues that this imbalance between our reach and our resources is intrinsic. It is imperial overstretch: because of our geopolitical aspirations we are now impoverished. I think this is an entirely unfounded analysis. After all, we are spending 5 percent of our GNP on defense. In John Kennedy's time, at the apogee of our power, we were spending 10 percent. And the budget as outlined by Secretary Cheney at the beginning of the year projected a decline to 4 percent by the mid-'90s, which is a very modest, reasonable percentage of GNP.

Yes, we have this imbalance. But it is not caused by our geopolitical aspirations. It has domestic and, if you like, philosophical causes which are entirely curable. I am as distressed as you by our secretaries' tin-cup missions around the world. I think, however, if we ordered our economic and social priorities, such missions would be unnecessary.

The Question of Burden-Sharing

Burden-sharing is like apple pie. I'm all for having our allies doing anything that they can both economically and militarily to help us. But that ought not be a condition for American action.

I'm also disturbed by the petulance of a lot of congressmen with the slowness of the Japanese, for example, to respond. I'm not sure that I particularly would like to see the flag of the rising sun fluttering over too many far-away places in the world. Do we really want a world in which Japan and Germany have changed their constitutions and are now sending troops throughout the world? We've had that experience and it was an unhappy one.

I'm much happier with American troops and, if necessary, French and British, or in this regional dispute, Arab troops helping us out. I'm all in favor of it. I think it's a welcome addition. But it ought not be a condition for American action. If our interests are at stake, if the peace of the world is at stake, we have to act; if our allies help, that's okay. If not, we have to act alone.
Defining World Power

Until August 2 we were drifting into this notion that military power had become obsolete and the real currency of world power was economic. That myth lasted about three months and it’s gone. Real power is a combination of a number of factors. America is not as predominant and preeminent economically today as it was in 1950. But that was a very anomalous time. We produced almost half of world GNP in 1950, but that’s because our rivals were all sorting out the rubble of World War II. We’ve now returned to the American norm for this century — the pre-war norm — of producing between a fifth and a quarter of world GNP. And that’s probably where we will remain for the next generation or two.

We don’t have the economic independence that we had in the ’50s. But, again, this notion that all power is economic, or that in this new information age how many computers or Toyotas one produces is the real measure of power has been completely exploded. World power has many aspects: economic, military, diplomatic and political. The United States is the only power in the world that has them all in remarkable quantity. And that makes us unique: the only possible leader of a world alliance.

The Lesson of the Persian Gulf

I’m rather sanguine about national will. In some ways, we have Saddam Hussein to thank for that. He banished all that nonsense about the obsolescence of military power and the end of history. It is an American assumption that every time a war ends, war in general has ended. We thought that after World War I and after World War II. We’re always the first country to rush to demobilize.

It is a tribute to the American spirit that we are uncomfortable with military power. Luigi Barzini once described even American interventionists as “impatient isolationists” — people who want to take care of the Kaiser and Hitler and then hurry home to take care of things domestically. That’s in our nature.

Before Saddam, we were drifting in the post-Cold War euphoria into believing that because the Soviet threat had been abolished, there would be no more threats. I remember a press conference about six months ago in which a reporter asked President Bush in relation to the $300 billion defense budget, “Who’s the enemy?” — implying that there is none, so that having all these ships and tanks was an exercise in redundancy. Saddam has reminded us that there are no normal times. Even normal times are inherently abnormal. The drift in Congress and elsewhere towards radical disarmament, physical and intellectual, has been arrested.

I hope it will not prove a temporary phenomenon. I think the
lesson of the Gulf is a serious one that will stay with us. Even though I
don’t expect much support for the, may I say, Jacksonian vision that I
have tried to elaborate today, I think it will not be dismissed as readily
today as it would have been six months ago.

Independent Concerns

The premise (of a question raised) is that we have a fixed amount
of national attention and it can be apportioned either to economic or
geopolitical concerns. I’m not sure I accept that premise. In the ’40s
and in the ’50s we were acting very much unilaterally in the world,
extremely preoccupied with establishing a structure of containment. Yet
at the same time we were the preeminent economic power in the world.
We built a remarkable industrial base that was the envy of the world.

I don’t attribute the subsequent decline of our industrial strength to
too much attention on the geopolitical. That slides us into the Kennedy
hypothesis that if we spend too much energy or attention abroad, we
don’t have enough left at home. It seems to me that these are indepen-
dent concerns. We have economic problems at home that ought to be
and can be addressed with domestic initiatives and a reordering of our
domestic priorities. But the future of our economy has very little to do
with whether we remain in the Philippines or support the government
in El Salvador or challenge Iraq in the Persian Gulf.

A New Strategic Environment

I think one of the reasons the Democratic Party turned away from
the liberal-internationalist vision was Vietnam. It created a kind of anti-
anti-communism in the Democratic Party. Now, however, with the
decline of communism, we are in a position to outline a new kind of
internationalism, one that would appeal to Democrats who had enough
of anti-communism with Vietnam.

There is now a new strategic environment with these small powers
that will rather quickly become regional and even international threats.
One of the reasons I’m trying to frame the debate in this way is to try to
shift the focus and to see if by presenting the reality of this new type of
threat, we cannot at least develop a consensus that America ought to
lead the struggle against it.

A Harbinger of Things to Come

I spent a lot of time on the Gulf because it made an abstraction
quite real. In the immediate future, the Weapon States will probably
have to be oil states because these weapons are so expensive that only
states that have the structure of an oil state — i.e., where a state controls
all the national income — can allocate enough resources to build them.

I don’t at all intend this to be a crusade against Middle Eastern
powers. The Middle East is simply a harbinger of what is to come. They
will be the oil states for the next decade or so. But soon, and in the decades after, states all over the world — Brazil, Argentina, North Korea, Pakistan — will acquire this capacity. It is going to be an extremely scary and difficult time. Unless we begin to think about this now, twenty years ahead of time, it will be too late.

The Persian Gulf is concentrating our attention on the prospect, but it is illustrative only of what is to come. The Gulf states are able to bring the future prematurely, if you like, because of their peculiar economic structure. But it is absolutely inevitable that our children are going to live in a world of small countries armed with these weapons and missiles. It is a nightmare. I'm arguing that if we start to think about that now, at least come to a consensus that we have a leading role in dealing with this problem, we might leave our children a little more secure.
The Henry M. Jackson Foundation

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</table>

Congressional Advisory Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Bill Bradley</td>
<td>Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Norman D. Dicks</td>
<td>Sen. Sam Nunn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sen. Robert Dole</td>
<td>Rep. Dan Rostenkowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Slade Gorton</td>
<td>Sen. Arlen Specter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Mark O. Hatfield</td>
<td>Sen. Ted Stevens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg</td>
<td>Rep. Don Young</td>
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Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robin K. Pasquarella</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan H. Gould</td>
<td>Office Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa Napoli</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Silvernale</td>
<td>Administrative Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Kurlinski</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>