

VISIONARY

**Building Agile and
Adaptive Leaders for a
Complex Environment**

by Lieutenant General
Stephen R. Lanza

The Henry M. Jackson/
William Van Ness
Lectures on Leadership

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The Henry M. Jackson Foundation was founded in 1983 to continue the unfinished work of the late Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson in the fields in which he played a key leadership role: international affairs education, human rights, environment and natural resources management, and public service. Through its grantmaking and strategic initiatives, the Foundation seeks to make a lasting impact and perpetuate the Jackson legacy for the benefit of future generations.

The Henry M. Jackson/William Van Ness Lectures on Leadership was established to honor and link two men whose careers were interwoven for many decades. The series recognizes the remarkable qualities that its immediate past president, William Van Ness, Jr., and Senator Jackson demonstrated in their decades of service. Both exemplify the good judgment, integrity, and character inherent in true leadership. The Henry M. Jackson / William Van Ness Lectures on Leadership are designed to attract lecturers who showcase the qualities of leadership mentioned above and which are highlighted in the Foundation’s 25th anniversary publication, *The Nature of Leadership: Lessons from an Exemplary Statesman*.



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January 15, 2015
Kane Hall, University of Washington

Introduction

Welcome. I'm John Hempelmann, president of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. I want to welcome you tonight to the fourth Jackson /Van Ness lecture with Lt. General Stephen R. Lanza. As you know, the Foundation furthers the legacy of the late Senator Jackson, who was a distinguished member of the House and the Senate for more than 40 years. Senator Jackson was a congressman from Everett and a senator from the State of Washington. For our military visitors here, you might not know the Senator was one of the leading spokesmen for a strong United States military during his entire career.

When he was in the U.S. Senate, he chaired what is now called the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. Because of his interest and involvement in military affairs, he became the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He was a close advisor to several presidents, valued by leaders from both parties for his expertise and judgment when it came to military affairs.

The Jackson Foundation has been in existence for over 30 years and it continues the legacy of the Senator primarily in four areas that he was active in: human rights, international affairs education, energy and natural resources management, and public service. Since we've been in existence, we have been a major supporter of the University of Washington and, in particular, the Henry M. Jackson School of International Affairs. The Foundation is very deeply involved in advancing leadership of all types. That is the purpose of this lecture.

We have named the lecture after the Senator, but also after Bill Van Ness, who served a long and distinguished tenure as president of the Jackson Foundation. Bill was Chief Counsel for the Senator when he chaired the Interior Committee. He is one of the smartest and brightest lawyers of his era. He led many of the legislative efforts on the Senator's behalf, which included many notable pieces of legislation. Perhaps the most important was the National Environmental Policy Act, which has changed the way we view all of the major actions of the federal government in assessing environmental impacts. For 20 years, he led this Foundation and continued the work that he did for the Senator while on staff.

I am delighted to welcome General Stephen Lanza to give the Jackson / Van Ness Lecture on Leadership. The General is the most senior Army officer on the West Coast. He took command of I-Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) in February after 35 years of distinguished military service.

The I-Corps is a major formation headquartered south of Tacoma at JBLM. It has an illustrious history from the First World War, the Second World War, and in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The General commands forces on the West Coast, but also in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan. I-Corps is focused on the Pacific. In fact, as many of you know, much of our foreign and military policy has tilted from Europe to the Pacific. This theater is an area of great influence and interest to our government and our military services.

General Lanza has earned high praise. The Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, called General Lanza “a tested warrior, a proven leader, and an effective, tenacious

commander.” General Vincent Brooks, Commander of the U.S. Army in the Pacific, said of General Lanza, “He’s the kind of guy you want to follow.” I can think of no better description for a leader than those words and I’m delighted to welcome General Stephen Lanza.



Lieutenant General Stephen R. Lanza assumed command of I-Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord on February 6, 2014. I-Corps is a globally responsive and regionally aligned force that supports the Pacific region. It is comprised of the 7th Infantry Division at JBLM, the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, I-Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama, Japan, the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command at JBLM, and the United States Army-Alaska brigade combat teams located at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Fort Wainwright.

LTG Lanza was commissioned into the Field Artillery in 1980 after graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point. He also holds masters degrees from Central Michigan University and the National War College at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. He has also served as a National Security Fellow at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

LTG Lanza's command assignments include the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord; 5th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq; and the 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. LTG Lanza's operational deployment experience includes Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia; Operation Joint Guard, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq; and Operation New Dawn, Iraq.

Building Agile and Adaptive Leaders for a Complex Environment

Thank you very much, John. It is indeed an honor and a privilege to be here tonight. I want to thank the Foundation for giving me the opportunity, but more important, for enabling the military to continue to stay linked to the people we serve and that includes all of you here today. This is a very diverse group and it is wonderful to be here.

I want to thank the University of Washington for hosting tonight's talk. Before I start tonight, I'd just like to point out that this relationship between you and your military is essential. As we come out of Iraq and Afghanistan, it's important that we stay connected to the people we serve because the trust you have placed in us as an institution, as a profession, is very important. We need to make sure that as we continue to serve as your military, we sustain the trust you have in us.

I'm here to talk to you tonight about leadership, but I also really want to talk about leader development. In our profession, in our culture, developing leaders is critical. As the Army continues to adapt, as we continue to evolve, what we want to do as a profession is determine how to develop the next generation of leaders. I'd like to talk about adaptive and agile leadership. To a degree, the military is no different than any other profession. Every profession has leaders.

Every profession looks at how to adapt and how to develop leaders. How do those leaders accomplish whatever mission you've given them to do? Let me start out with a map of the world. I want to show you this map because this is the world that we face every day. This is the world that is evolving.

In my 30-year career I've seen two major changes. First, when the wall came down in Europe. When the wall was up in Europe, it pretty much set the conditions on how the security environment was going to be faced. Senator Jackson dealt with that security environment in the U.S. Senate. Some of you dealt with that security environment in different professions. But when the wall came down it changed the dynamics. The second big change was 9/11. That is changing every day as we speak. This is the world that we wake up to every day in the military. This is a world in conflict. What we want to do in the military is establish how we operate in a complex environment. But, more important, how do we win in a complex environment? Because you, the people we serve, want us to be able to win in an environment that is changing every single day. I haven't mentioned what's going on in Australia. I have not added what just happened in Paris, or what has gone on in Belgium today. This is the velocity of instability. This is what the young leaders, the military leaders of the future, will face. These situations and others will continue to arise and evolve.

What's important about this as we look at leader development in the military is that we as a military have to adapt quickly because we have to respond to the adoption of policies that in some cases are not mature, that are not resourced properly, or that do not have the right guidance. A military leader has to take those policies and implement

them on the ground or in the sea or in the air. That's the challenge we face in this world of instability in the velocity of conflict. It affects every continent in the world. We are concerned about activities in the South China Sea, in Africa, in South America and here in the homeland. It's not just terrorism. I haven't even talked about cyber issues and the impact of cybersecurity.

The velocity of instability has adjusted global conditions and your military operates in that environment. This is what I want to really focus on for the next couple of minutes and I think it's important, because it gives you the context about how we operate.

Let me talk a little bit about why you need this type of military leader and really how we build that military leader. In order to get a young officer or a young non-commissioned officer to operate in this world, we do want him to be agile and adaptive. We take these young leaders and we develop them within our system. The Marines have their system and the Navy has their system. The Army takes a leader and we want him to be able to be adaptive, but we want him to do it in a decentralized way. We want to take an Army leader and say, "We've given you intent. We've told you what we want you to do." We want him to operate in an environment where he's empowered, he's engaged, and he's accountable. We want him to be able to take a mission-type order and to be able to execute that without somebody being over him because he has to adapt to that world. He has to adapt to a threat that is continually changing. He has to adapt to an environment that's continually changing. A good leader should be able to do that.

More important, we want our leaders to be trusted. We

want them to trust us. And we have to trust them implicitly. The bedrock of our profession and what we do is based on trust. It's not blind trust, but it is trust. And it's trust that's earned. How do we earn that trust?

We earn it because we look at an officer or a non-commissioned officer who has character, who is competent and committed. Those are the three things we consider. We develop them in our system in order to do that. They operate in unison, in tandem. You want a leader who can be respected, but again, be trusted. One of the things we learned after 10 years of conflict is that you don't want to confuse competence with character. Let me tell you what I mean by that.

In the last decade I think you've read in the media where we've seen our military leaders confuse competence and character. In some cases competence has outweighed the type of leader you need and you want in this country. We have looked at our training to make sure we have the right leaders where character comes first. Character comes first and competence follows. That's very, very important because we should never confuse competence with character in combat or in any type of operation.

As we empower these leaders and trust them, they also have to assess risk. It is nothing that you wouldn't do in business, nothing that you wouldn't do in academia. You have to assess how you accomplish your mission. But I think we do it a little bit differently in the military.

I'm empowering young leaders to make key decisions that affect life and death. I think what's different about the military, and I don't say this to be pejorative or to be funny, is that in our profession you have given us the responsibility

and in some cases the authority to take life. And it's very, very important to understand that because in combat, and some of you in here have been in combat, those decisions are extremely important. You make decisions based on values. The military is a values-based organization. We're probably no different than a lot of other organizations, a lot of companies. But we have a set of values. Our leaders come to the military from a wide spectrum of society. They represent the entire nation, the entire stream of population. As part of their military training we infuse in them a set of our values, our military values, in this case the values of the Army. We teach them a professional ethic because you have to have a professional ethic in order to operate in this kind of environment. That is extremely important. Again, it is no different than business. But again, because it may involve either conflict or taking human life, we want to trust that our military leaders are capable of making values-driven decisions.

Our military leaders have to be agile and adaptive not only for military conflict, but they have to be able to prevent, shape, and to win. That is what you want your military to do.

We want to prevent conflict. John mentioned this rebalance in the Pacific. The rebalance of the Pacific is not about conflict; it's about preventing conflict. We want to avoid conflict and miscalculation. It's about de-escalation. You don't want to have conflict in the Pacific because of the economic issues. You don't want to go to war with China. You prevent it by building partner capacity. You do that by theater security cooperation through partnering with other nations' militaries. For most of the nations in Asia, their militaries are their first responders. They don't have a FEMA.

They don't have a Department of Homeland Security. Their armies are their first responders. They are the guarantors of their security, not the police. They are the civic law as much as they are their national law.

You want to make sure that you can prevent conflict and you also want to shape. How do you shape this partnership? You're seeing it going on right now in Iraq. You're seeing shaping operations going on. You're seeing it now as we come out of Afghanistan. What we're going to do is help shape the Ghani administration. You're seeing shaping operations go on in Africa right now. We need to assess the security environment, to look at the velocity of instability and consider how we shape that for the future. The key is to avoid conflict wherever you can. Your military every day is looking to do that and we do it with the other services as well.

The third part of this is you want us to be able to win, and if we have to win, then to win decisively. That is the North Korea scenario—a North Korea that implodes, a North Korea that has Weapons of Mass Destruction that have to be eliminated. You want your military to be able to prevent, to be able to shape, and to be able to win. Leaders must be prepared to operate using all three of those strategies.

In every organization, you must have a way to train. What the military does very effectively is that we operate in three different spheres. There's an operational sphere of training a leader which is what we do every single day. Those are where the units do actual operations, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, or out in the fleet. That's the job that we do every single day. We develop our leaders in those particular jobs to be empowered, to be engaged, to be accountable. To conduct their operation in terms of how they would do their military

business. That's one sphere, that's the operational sphere.

The institutional sphere is our school sphere. That's where we send our officers and non-commissioned officers to school. It's our basic training. It's where we infuse the values and the Army ethic. It's the constant training that our leaders go through as they progress through the military. It's the fellowship that we're bringing here to the University of Washington. That's the institutional sphere. That's the school sphere.

The other sphere that's very important is self-development. That's the one where you keep learning as a professional throughout your career. All three of these spheres give you different kinds of experiences. We bring those experiences together to turn out a kind of leader that can take young Marines, young soldiers, young airmen, young sailors, and have them accomplish a mission—alone—perhaps without guidance, perhaps without someone to talk to. In the world that we operate in today you have to be prepared to do that. I think the military is very effective in doing that by the way we train our subordinate leaders.

One of the bigger differences is that I can't recruit the kind of leaders we need. I can't recruit them from a headhunter company. I can't go out and get someone who can captain a ship. I have to build them from within. A potential leader must have specific jobs as a young ensign, as a young officer. He has to learn everything about that ship before he takes command of it. He wears a command pinned on his uniform right now to signal that he had commanded at the O-5 or the O-6 level. I think one of the fallacies that you sometimes hear is, "Well, we can add more people. We can add more soldiers. We can add more sailors." You sure

can. You can add a whole bunch of people to the military. But what you can't build overnight is the leadership skills that are required to deal with that velocity of instability that I talked about. That takes years.

A Battalion Commander in the U.S. Army takes about 16 to 17 years to build. When I say "build," I mean giving him the leadership skills, the training, those experiences at junior levels, at different levels of command starting small and getting bigger and bigger before he or she can take command of 750 men and women. That's just one Lieutenant Colonel. You can grow your military, but it's very hard to grow leaders. It's very hard to grow a non-commissioned officer.

One of the biggest differences between our military and any other militaries in the world is the way we use our non-commissioned officers. Our NCOs are the backbone of what we do. If you look at other militaries, they are usually very officer-centric and that's not only here in the Pacific region. Very little responsibility, very little authority is given to non-commissioned officers in other countries. Another difference is how we empower our non-commissioned officers. We empower them not only to train and lead our soldiers, but to take care of them. That is a big difference. We want an environment that is not officer-centric; we want an environment where our NCOs are responsible for making decisions.

In an environment that moves very slowly because of bureaucratic decisionmaking, it is difficult to have leaders who are adaptive and agile. You don't develop leaders who can adapt to a complex environment or adjust to changing conditions. In conflict, whether it's in preventing, shaping, or winning, it's going to happen. It's going to happen on a ship,

a sub, an aircraft, or on the ground. We teach our leaders at every level that they can adapt to change, they can adapt to a different environment. They can speed up their decision-making process, because the speed of making decisions has to be faster in some cases than the communications they receive. That's why this intent is so important.

I come back to intent. What commanders do to develop leaders, what they do to affect mission command is they deal with intent. It's very prescriptive, the intent. I give you a task, I give you the purpose, and I give you the end state. From there I let you figure out how to do it. That's very different than some businesses. It's very different than some business models where I'm telling you how to navigate from Point A to Point B. I'm enabling the junior officers and the non-commissioned officers to do that. I've got to be able to underwrite that risk.

One of the issues when we develop our leaders in the military is how do you underwrite that risk? How do you enable your leaders to grow and develop and create the environment where they can make a mistake and learn from that mistake? I always talk about this in a different form where some will say, "Well, we don't want to be zero defect." And we're not. We have to make sure we understand the difference between a mistake and misconduct. We make mistakes in the military. We learn from these mistakes. We adapt. We use those as lessons to progress and move forward. The misconduct issue is a separate issue.

As our Army gets smaller, and I know I was not going to talk about sequestration, but I'm going to talk about it because I think it's important. As our military gets smaller, perhaps not just our Army, then we have to be able to do this

even more rapidly. Because the world is not going to change. By the time you're a commissioned officer, there will be more clouds that we have not anticipated.

Let me give you a couple of examples. I did not anticipate we would have a Division Commander and a headquarters in Liberia. I didn't anticipate that there would be 3,000 soldiers right now in North Africa. I did not anticipate that we'd be sending more soldiers to Europe. I did not anticipate we would be going back to Iraq to retrain the Iraqi security forces and provide them with more equipment. I did not anticipate that President Ghani in Afghanistan would ask for more soldiers to come to Afghanistan to help stabilize the government against the Taliban. I did not anticipate that China would be all over South America and that countries like Brazil and others are saying, "You know, they're here, but they're not the best friends when they come here." These are the things that you have to respond to.

What happens when this occurs in the world is that policy decisions are made and they are made rapidly. Some of you work with policy. You don't have a lot of time to prepare the military response to those policy decisions. The readiness of our leaders enabled to respond is extremely important. In the military right now we have 10 divisions. Seven of those divisions are committed as we speak today. Who would have thought that after Afghanistan and Iraq? I didn't anticipate that. I didn't anticipate that the division we just stood up at Joint Base Lewis-McChord would have a unit now going to Afghanistan. The reason I'm sharing this with you is because this velocity of instability that I talk about and winning in conflict are extremely important.

The leader development piece is what enables us to do

that; it's what enables us to adapt. It's what enables us to take soldiers to an environment that we didn't anticipate after 9/11 because we were training for what before 9/11? Pretty much a standard conflict against a threat such as the Soviet Union and others. We didn't anticipate counterinsurgency. We didn't anticipate fighting an enemy that was not aligned with any nation. Our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, Marines, Coast Guard, civilians, they adapted on the ground. They adapted because of our leader development program. They also adapted because of the trust we have to let them do that.

As I wrap this up and take your questions I think it's important to repeat a couple of key points. The world will continue to erupt in crisis. We need adaptive and agile leaders to be able to operate in complex circumstances. We want our soldiers to operate with trust based on mission command, under empowered, engaged, accountable leaders. We value character, competence, and commitment. We never want to confuse character with competence. We build our leaders from within. We take them from society and infuse them with values. We give them the Army ethic. We enable them to make life and death decisions and we place trust in them. We underwrite mistakes to enable them to learn and move forward. We build a system in the military and the Army that's based on three spheres: the operational, the institutional, and the self-development, all of which give our leaders the experiences they need to command men and women in conflict.

What we do is we assess our effectiveness as leaders, not our performance. We assess each other. We do 360-degree evaluations. We do peer ratings. We do upper and lower

ratings. We see ourselves at all levels. I think that the assessment piece of leadership and leader development is something that's very, very important. It is what enables the profession to continue to develop. Because one of the things you want to do in a profession is to police yourself. You want to have a set of values. You want to be able to look and be introspective and say, "These are the challenges we have." And we've done this even more after Iraq and Afghanistan because we found we need to say, "How are we doing? How is my boss doing? How is my subordinate doing? How is my peer doing?"

Those who have been in business or any kind of profession know that peer to peer is the toughest thing to do because your peers know the truth. In leader development and in leadership your peers really know your skills. They know your strengths and your weaknesses because when you talk about leadership in any profession you can get away with your superior. Your superior sees you in a different way perhaps than your subordinate or your subordinate may see you in a different way, but your peers know.

Whether it's at the training center in California or the one in Louisiana or Yakima, we're assessing our leaders and we're providing them feedback. That serves as a basis for how we prepare ourselves for the future.

The last point on leader development is we walk around a lot of airports and people always thank us for our service. I've been doing this for the last few years and as I walk around in airports I hear, "General Lanza, thank you for your service." You tell our young officers and our NCOs, "Thank you for your service." But for those of you here today, I'd like to remind you that you don't need to be in a uniform to serve.

There are many different ways to serve your nation. I would like to thank you for your support and your trust.



Questions and Answers

Q: General, the Senator was a great believer in leaders doing their homework and having the facts. He also was a great believer in going outside of the immediate circle, going outside the Senate and, in fact, outside the government, often to academia. How do military leaders do their homework and get outside the circle of the Army or the circle of Department of Defense?

GL: We were not very good at this prior to 9/11. Before 9/11, we were very stove piped. We were very Army-centric, service-centric. We were very military-centric. We did not operate very well interagency; we didn't operate well in a joint environment. I think one of the positive factors of conflict, and I say "positive" in terms of how it changes an institution, is that this has brought the interagency closer together. It has brought the services closer together. It has forced us out of our comfort level. It has forced us to have to cooperate. A lot of this initially is based on budget issues, which has really not allowed us to cooperate perhaps as much. But I think over the last few years we've been able to operate in a joint environment, an intergovernmental environment, and that has been extremely important. We have reached out to the civilian sector and the civilian sector is reaching out to us.

Second, we've developed a program that encourages us to stay engaged with the people we serve. There was an article in Time Magazine that talked about a military apart. On that

cover were a bunch of young soldiers, their faces were all blacked out. They looked like they had night vision goggles on and hadn't slept in a few days. The article talked about a military that perhaps was moving away from the nation they serve. That we were becoming almost a warrior culture unto ourselves where you did not know us and you only knew us from Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have done a very good job in reaching out to the public, I think, to establish links to academia, to establish links to think tanks and to speak in public about the military. We want to let people see what we do, to bring you onto the bases. We had a function at the house a few months ago. There was a man there who said, "You know I've driven on I-5 for the last 100 years and all I see is JBLM the next eight exits. I had no idea what was behind that wall." We do not want to be America's gated community. We want to make sure that we're transparent; we want to make sure we're collaborative. We want to make sure that we don't lose your trust because you don't know what we do. I think we need to continue to do that and I appreciate you asking that question.

Q: With military service you have your core principles; you have your core foundations that transcend generations in terms of developing leaders. But clearly people adapt, people are changing, the world is changing. Therefore, leadership tends to have to change sometimes. Could you talk about some of the changes that you've seen and where you see leadership having to change?

GL: Let me talk about a couple of major things that we've changed. The assessments have changed. We also spend a lot of time now talking about the human domain. One of the biggest changes we've made at Leavenworth, which is our schoolhouse in Kansas, is the work we've done on understanding the human domain and the impacts of how to develop leaders. We have not spent a lot of time doing it. We have restructured our non-commissioned officer education system, our basic training, and our military service academy. The emphasis is on developing leaders, and this includes empowering leaders at every level. We realized that it's important to start this early on in the leader development process. And the first place to start is with our values. We want to inculcate our values at the very beginning.

We had some challenges a few years ago in Aberdeen and other places because we had forgotten about infusing our leaders with values. That's one of the major changes that has happened. Our training at home station has changed. Over the last couple of years it's been very prescriptive. It's been very prescriptive because we were going to Iraq and Afghanistan; we had a template. We fell in on that template and we weren't doing a good job developing leaders on how

to train. We have restructured our home station training to where we adjust our training at home station for complexity. We adjust the conditions. We give the leaders complex problems at home station. When I say “home station” I’m talking about what we do on the bases, what we do at our training centers. Our training has changed to do that. The third thing we have done is integrated the total force. We had to do this due to sequestration and because we will never be able to fight alone. In our training at home station now we have integrated the different services, whether it’s here in Washington State, whether it’s the Marines down in San Diego, the National Guard, the Reserves. That is extremely important. We have brought the Japanese and Korean militaries here to Washington State. We are putting more leaders and more teams into different countries. These are big changes because when you do that it creates a better understanding of what we need to do in this complex environment. Part of our ability to operate in that environment is having access. We gain access through our partnerships with other nations, whether they come here or whether we go there. Those are some of the big changes that we’ve done here in the last couple years. I’m proud to say that the leaders you have in I-Corps are doing that every day in the Pacific region through our Pacific Pathways mission.

Q: What has your experience been with the role of social media and technology in leadership development?

GL: This is a double-edged sword. Social media right now in the next generation of leaders is essential. Apps are essential. Social media is essential in how we communicate. There is

a danger by my generation to use social media as a measure to save money because we want to put everything on an app. We want to put everything and hang it on the web. We want to put everything on Facebook. In some cases we lose the human dimension. We lose the ability for face-to-face engagement. I think there's a danger, there's a balance with social media. That's point number one.

The second point with social media is that our soldiers are constantly engaged not only with what goes on at work, but also with what goes on at home. Every single problem our soldiers have every single day is right here. They never break contact because of social media, whether it's a Tweet or an Instagram. I love social media; it is a tremendous way to communicate. Colonel Johnson loves it because it's a tremendous way to get our message out. We did a sexual assault summit on Friday; within the first hour we had 29,000 hits on our site, which is phenomenal. Getting your message out is critical. But on the other hand, are we trying to leverage social media to cut corners where we have gaps? Is there a danger in terms of how we build our leaders by how we leverage social media to avoid the human interaction? Or does it exacerbate problems in terms of stress on our soldiers and hinder our ability to build resiliency? Again, it is a mixed bag here. We are not going to get rid of it. I think we have to figure out how to adapt it productively and constructively.

The third thing about social media that I get concerned about is security leaks. I think what you see every single day is what's on the web. Whether it's extremism or cyber issues, I think you have to watch what's on the web. I worry about younger children. I worry about the impact about policing it,

and then I worry about how to police it and how much does it violate your authorities and your rights. That's a discussion that's coming. It's probably already occurring inside of D.C. about what authorities now do you have with Google and with Facebook and others?

I get concerned also as a military officer when I have fake websites, fake Facebook and Skype sites that impact people's families and their lives. When people use it to secure money saying that "I'm General Ray Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army," and people are putting money onto those sites because they think it is Ray Odierno. I've had multiple fake sites about me when I got back from Iraq. It probably warrants a discussion and I would be interested at the University and here at the Foundation, what are your points on social media? Is it for personal interest or what are the other issues you have with social media? If you extrapolate that into the cyber world and into other areas, how would you discuss that here in academia? Maybe that's something we can discuss one of these days—examining social media in different settings under different conditions. What is the impact of social media in terms of the world in conflict with the velocity of instability and what is the impact on that? I don't have a good answer for your question, but I'm just giving you some of my concerns. But it is productive and it's necessary. I worry sometimes how the balance swings back and forth.

Q: Earlier you talked about the three different ways the Army develops leaders—the operational side of training, education in the schools, and the professional development that we undertake on ourselves. As a college student, midshipman, cadet, or also as a junior officer, how do you recommend training ourselves professionally?

GL: There are three things you need to do. I think you need to understand history. I think you need to understand history in decision-making and historical issues that impact decision-making at the strategic and tactical levels. Whether it's Eisenhower and Marshall, or Grant, pick someone you want to study. Choose somebody who had to go through these types of decisions in their time and study how they dealt with the velocity of instability, how they dealt with a security environment that was unstable and how they made decisions. I think that's important.

It's also important to understand things like Ori Brafman's book on leadership *The Starfish and the Spider*, and to look at how systems adapt in a complex world. Also, learn about complexity and complexity theory. I'm not trying to suggest that a military officer, a non-commissioned officer, needs to know complexity theory. Only Navy guys do. New guys in the Navy understand, if you're a new guy you comprehend complexity theory. But understand complexity. In a military world, how do you take complexity and very rapidly make it clear so that you achieve shared understanding? That is the second thing I'd offer you.

The third thing I'd offer is that you must understand in the future the relationship between civilians and military. Also, know the civilians' role in their authority over the

military and how we work together—civilians and military. That includes how to work as a joint force. I think as you become older you're going to see more and more joint basing. You're going to see more and more joint force integration because of the resource issues. I would postulate here to some of the older guys that we're going to see a Goldwater—Nichols Two sometime on our watch. Goldwater—Nichols Two is what made us joint. The three things I would offer you are: historical decision-making; understanding complexity; and then civil military authorities and understanding how the joint environment works.

As a young ensign or young lieutenant or young non-commissioned officer, you also have to be competent. I talked about character, competence, and commitment—those three things. When you go out in front of your sailors or your Marines or your airmen or soldiers, they're going to assess you. The most important thing I talked about in my lecture is trust. You've got to earn and build that trust. So yes, you're going to do a lot of studying and lot of reading. If they can't trust you, then everything else that follows from that is lost, because as I said, the bedrock of what we do in our profession is trust. Earning their trust is extremely, extremely important.

Q: General, as you had mentioned earlier, when you joined the Army it went from destroying the Communist ward in Europe to missions in Haiti and Somalia to Desert Storm and now we're in this mess as you show on the map. What are some of the things that you learned as a company grade officer that you've kept true that you could share with us, especially as these new officers get commissioned?

GL: I'll give you my experience. What I learned is that the unexpected will happen and are you trained and ready for the unexpected. I was a Lieutenant at Fort Campbell and I was told that the focus was going to be in Europe. Next thing I knew, I found myself loading out for Grenada. I found myself in Europe when the wall came down and peace was going to break out in Europe. Then we found ourselves in Desert Storm. Then we found ourselves in Bosnia or in Kosovo. Then 9/11 happened and the world turned upside down and we found ourselves in Iraq and Afghanistan for years. What I learned as a young officer is that I can't stop that from happening. What I can do is make sure that the people I lead, the people I'm responsible for, need to be trained and ready so that they can respond to this when necessary. As I said earlier, you can get the policy wrong. But if you get the policy wrong, it's your military that deals with it. That's part of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic components of strategy. What I always focus on is that training readiness is paramount. The more time you spend building readiness, building units that are trained and ready, the more you can adapt to change. That's what I learned as a young officer and that's what I continue to talk about today as a General Officer. I don't think that's going to change. I

think that's the same whether you're in the fleet, whether you are in a wing, or whether you're in a corps. It's something that I think we have to consider.

My concern as we move forward is that as resources draw down, as we go to sequestration, my concern then is a hollow military. My concern is that you have a resource mismatch where the policy issues are made, but then they're not resourced for execution. If you go down to a certain number with sequestration and you cannot execute the strategy the nation has given you, then one of two things has to happen. You have to change the strategy or you've got to say what you're not going to do.

I've got a listening session at Joint Base Lewis-McChord next week where all the civilians and business leaders and the governor are going to come talk about why the military shouldn't draw down. As you talk to your civic leaders, ask them about it, because I didn't vote for sequestration. Again, I'm being candid with you today. But in this world of instability, it's up to you ladies and gentlemen to determine where you have acceptable risk. I think that's a decision of our political leaders, it's a decision of those we serve. I think that's something that's going to be debated here over the next couple of years, whether it's the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea, whether it's extremism in the Middle East, or whether it's the growing role of China in cybersecurity in our nation. I'm not trying to be political here. I'm just giving you what I believe is the reality, because at the end of the day it is about how you measure risk. It really is about risk to the nation.

Q: Could you expand a little bit more about confusing character and competence?

GL: In the last decade we have spent a lot of time in combat. We have spent a lot of time coming back from combat, waiting a year at home station and going back to combat. In some cases we have taken units and put them in combat four and five times, in some cases six times. It depends on the type of unit. We have in some cases some very good leaders that are tremendous in combat. They're exactly the kind of people you want in combat. They're the kind of guys you want on your left or right. They're not necessarily the type of leaders that make the right ethical and moral decisions. They're not the kind of leaders that have the proper character to really uphold the values we have as a profession. In some cases, because of their competency, we overlooked character flaws. We overlooked character flaws at the expense of "I've got to get to the fight, I've got this particular leader, and he's just a damned good soldier. He's terrible back when we get back to the base. He does really bad things, but I've overlooked that. And I've overlooked it at the price of needing him in combat."

What I've found is that if I have a person of character, I can work on the competency piece. But if I lose character, I lose our ability to be a profession. I lose the trust you have in us. We can't have that in a military. We have had to reassess character in our military from senior leaders all the way on down. We've had to assess what it really means to be a professional. We have spent a lot of time in the last couple of years and now reassessing what it means to be a leader of character first and a competent leader second. Because if you

have character, then competence follows. You can't confuse a competent leader for a leader of character. If he violates your values, if he violates the ethic, that supersedes competency.

Q: I really appreciated your comments and your presentation. My question is about the map. As I look at the map I'm seeing conflict, challenge, and tension everywhere. As an academic in International Relations, Global Studies, we're problematizing the world. I worry about our young people who are feeling more and more disengaged because there is not an exciting and collaborative point of entry into real world situations. My question to you is: how do we build collaboration as a key part of leadership development so that one day we're looking not at velocity of conflict, but velocity of collaboration? And from your experience could you share with us a collaboration that you're proud of?

GL: From a military perspective, I will discuss some of the collaboration that makes us proud. I'll use Indonesia as an example. Indonesia over the last few years has had significant challenges. They just had an election in the last year where they did not have a coup. They just had a peaceful transition of power. They just had an election where not only was power transitioned, but the military enabled that transition to occur. That came through years and years of work with the Indonesian military and years and years of human rights issues that they've had, et cetera. That's one area that we should be proud of.

Another area that we should be proud of is addressing issues where we have commonality. I talked about China earlier. We are reaching out to nations where perhaps we

have different interests, but where do we have commonality? Where do we have commonality in terms of climate, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, access to the global commons? These are areas in which we are linked together. These are areas where, just speaking for the military, we can find common purpose. I may not agree with China, the nine-dashed line and what they're doing in the South China Sea. But if I can find ways to partner with them on humanitarian assistance disaster relief, which in the Pacific is probably 80 percent of our focus, if I can find ways to partner with them on climate, on access to the global commons, which we all share, are there ways to leverage and prevent conflict by doing that? I would argue there are ways. That's the second area.

The third area goes back to cyber and the discussions that we're having right now collectively on cybersecurity. Because again, that's an area we have in common not only militarily but economically, politically, and is there room to grow? We have reached out to countries in the cyber area. We have set up a cyber-command in the Army, United States Army Cyber Command. We've set up a combatant command called, "Cybercom," commanded by a great Naval Admiral, Mike Rogers.

This ability to build partner capacity is going to be extremely important. The more partner capacity you can build, the more engagements you can build with different countries that not only gives you access, but enables you to have the relationships that are so important to de-escalate conflict. Egypt is one very good example. When Sisi took over, you can argue about what happened in Egypt in Tahir Square, but the relationship that General Dempsey, our

chairman, had with Egypt enabled us to avoid conflict that could have been in massive proportions. It enabled us to do the same thing in Israel, not with Netanyahu, but with his generals.

The exchange that we have here with the fellowship, bringing officers to our country, bringing non-commissioned officers to our country, that is extremely important because these are lifetime relationships. If you want to avoid conflict, having relationships with other nations is so, so important. What I do worry about is an austere environment. Talking about strategy, what are we not going to do? In an environment where resources become limited you're going to go after whack-a-mole first. If you're a citizen sitting here in front of me, what do you want us to do? You want us to go after what's going to hurt you right now. I'm concerned about what I am not going after that's going to hurt you five and ten years from now if I don't prevent it and shape it. What if I move out of the Pacific? What if I fail to engage some of the countries we've been discussing today? What if I stop building those relationships? That's what also concerns me. It's not just the here and now; it is setting these ladies and gentlemen up for success to make sure that I can deal with this world. From a resource constrained environment, we have to look at that and then we also have to look at how we're going to do this again not only jointly, but as a total force. I do get concerned about that, about what we're not doing for the long term because the citizens are going to be concerned about near-term security issues.

Q: Given the international scope of threats, is there a certain foreign language you would encourage us to learn since we're still in school to enhance our adaptability?

GL: Yes, Arabic and Chinese. Don't worry about Spanish.

Q: Some of the Army's largest successes could be considered to have been made using Special Operations Forces, for example, in 2001, working with Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and even now in Iraq. Do you see the future Army, especially with cutbacks, utilizing Special Forces more often, or do you see the Army as a whole transitioning to smaller capabilities and counter measures?

GL: I see us building on the partnerships we have between soft and what's called "general purpose forces." Because of what's happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have built tremendous partnerships now with Special Forces and conventional forces working together. The conventional forces add depth and capacity to our Special Operations Forces because they're smaller. I see that growing even more. We are doing more partnered operations with Special Forces every day. We are doing those to build capacity and depth. You are going to see that increase. It's not just developing more special operators, it's linking the conventional force in every service to what our special operators do and then linking our Special Forces together to work jointly. You are going to see more of that, which is an outcome of what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, we did not work together, we did not talk to each other, and we operated in stovepipes. We have learned to work together and we've

learned the impact of how we inform each other and the necessity to be one team. You are seeing that at Joint Base Lewis-McChord with I-Corps Special Forces group and the Second Ranger Battalion. We're working together with them to include working with JSOC, Joint Special Operations Command. We're doing that right at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and we'll continue to do that in the future.

MR. HEMPELMANN: One of the qualities of leadership of Senator Jackson that's mentioned in the book, is that a great leader is inspiring. I don't know how you feel about tonight, but I was inspired. And I would also say to the General that the quotes I read out to you about him are not just accurate, but maybe even an understatement. If a great leader is one whom you feel you can trust, General Lanza is somebody you can trust and would be happy to follow.

On behalf of the Jackson Foundation and Bill Van Ness, we want to thank you all for coming, for sharing with the Jackson Foundation and the University of Washington this great opportunity to hear from one of the great leaders of our generation. Thank you.

GL: Thank you. Thank you very much.



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